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This Is the Enemy

It is high time that the American consumer recognized his enemies in Congress. That body is at present controlled by a bloc which is deliberately bent upon inflation. The House of Representatives is apparently about to follow the dictation of this group by passing an appropriation bill for the Commodity Credit Corporation which contains an amendment forbidding the use of subsidies to increase output or keep prices down, and by passing a tax bill to raise only one-fifth the amount which the Treasury had set as a minimum. The Senate may do better on either or both measures, but so far there is little sign that it will.

The inflationary bloc consists of an alliance between the Republicans and the reactionary Southern Democrats. Their dominant motive is to discredit the administration, at whatever cost to the nation and the citizens. Behind them, and directing their action, is an alliance between leaders of the conservative farm organizations and certain reactionary manufacturers. The farm leaders are betraying their constituents by their stand, since, though the farmers would profit in the present by inflation, they would later lose by it. Only the big industrialist gains by inflation in the end; and he gains only if the system which shelters him is not cracked by the strain.

Give the Country Time

The arguments which these interests use are disingenuous in the extreme. The farmers are told, for instance, that subsidies are inflationary, whereas it is perfectly obvious that the price increases which would follow their abolition would be far more inflationary. The farmers are also told that subsidies are contrary to the American system, whereas if the farmers had not received enormous subsidies in the past twenty years, there would be little agriculture left in America. Those who use these arguments are not misinformed; they are simply dishonest. Ample information about the matter has been given to Congress by the administration and by disinterested experts. The general public is now being educated, especially by the vigorous broadcasts of such popular news commentators as Walter Winchell and Raymond Gram Swing. If enough time can be gained by a presidential veto, Congress may be forced to back down by a surge of informed and angry public opinion. But if that is to happen, the public must not let itself be fooled by its enemies, who are trying to make scapegoats of labor and the President.

That Mysterious Meeting

During most of last week the press and the radio all over the world were spreading reports that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were about to meet, or perhaps, already meeting. We have no special inside information on this subject, and wouldn't reveal it if we had. We hope, however, that the reports are true and that the results of the conference are soon announced. We hope also that, as our Washington correspondent suggests in this issue, Chiang Kai-shek may have been one of the conferees. The commentators have been speculating that the meeting would formulate a final

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ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879
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warning and offer to the German people that if they do not capitulate at once, action against them on all fronts will be speeded up to the maximum degree until Germany is destroyed. Such a warning, accompanied by carefully coördinated plans for simultaneous attacks from several directions, would seem to us the best of sense. And after that, Japan.

Ashore in the Gilberts

The attack on Makin and Tarawa Islands in the Gilbert group represents an important new phase of the war against Japan. If we can hold these islands—and it is certain that we would not have gone ashore unless the military prospect was favorable—we shall have started what might be called a marine pincers movement against the great Japanese base at Truk, with the operations in the Solomons, New Britain and New Guinea as the other jaw of the pincers. To be sure, before reaching Truk we must first take other Japanese bases in the Marshalls, at Wake and elsewhere. If this is to be the main line of our attack on Japan, a long hard road lies before us. On the other hand, the attack on the Gilberts may be only diversionary, and the main thrust may be sudden, powerful and from an entirely different direction.

Overconfidence Gets a Shock

Until the news of the landing in the Gilberts most reports from the battle fronts had been rather gloomy for some days. In Russia, the Germans launched a powerful counter-offensive, and for the first time since early summer they forced the Red Army to fall back. Nazi troops captured several more of the Dodecanese Islands, overwhelming the small British garrisons which had been put there when Italy went out of the war. In Yugoslavia, Tito's men were under fierce German attack. In Italy, our forces were just beginning to advance again after being almost halted for about a fortnight, partly by bad weather, partly by stiff enemy resistance. In the Southwest Pacific, aside from the landing in the Gilberts, we continued to gain, but in no spectacular fashion. The bombing of Germany went on, in heavy force, and presumably must have inflicted serious damage. Bombing of this sort constitutes a new technique in warfare and there are therefore no firm precedents to justify confident assertions as to the amount of damage done.

These setbacks, while on the whole unimportant, may serve a useful purpose if they destroy the ridiculous overconfidence that exists within the United States. Both Germany and Japan are still extremely powerful nations, with large armies and, in the case of Japan, a formidable fleet. They have been trained far better than ourselves to endure hardship and sacrifice. The Japanese are being taught that this is a hundred-year war and that Japan will finally win because of her staying power. Both our enemies have the great present advantage (though it may become a liability in case of attack from several directions) of fighting on interior lines, with comparatively short and easy communications. Neither of them suffers the handicaps inherent in the organization of a democratic state, which allows advocates of a soft peace to hamper the war effort even, in our own case, as members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The enemy is all out for victory; we can count ourselves lucky if we are 60 to 70 percent out, so far as Congress is concerned.

Carol of Rumania

Former King Carol II of Rumania, now living in exile in Mexico, would hardly deserve any mention in these pages, were it not for three "ifs": if he had not hired the public-relations firm of Russell Birdwell and Associates at $35,000 a year to "sell" his majesty to the people of the United States; if he had not been announced as a featured speaker on the Columbia Broadcasting System's dramatized news program, Report to the Nation; and if our State Department could safely be relied upon to keep its ears closed to the ex-king's plea for permission to come to the United States.

Whatever reasons Carol may have for wishing to enter this country, whether he wants to get hold of the $80,000,000 of frozen Rumanian funds, or whether he hopes to convince the State Department of his political usefulness as a self-styled "free Rumanian" after the Nazis have been driven out of his former kingdom, the American people are entitled to be informed of his record. For when Carol hired Mr. Birdwell a few weeks ago, he complained, according to The New York Times of October 23, 1943, that "I have been misrepresented in some journalistic quarters," and he declared his intention "to tell my story truthfully and wholly whenever it is desired in the hope that I—and the democratic cause for which I fought and still wish to fight—will receive a fair and proper hearing."

What the King Might Say

As Carol says he intends to tell the truth, he might be expected to say something like this: "The greatest mistake of my royal career was jumping too late on the Nazi bandwagon. That's the reason why Rumania lost the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, Bessarabia to the Soviet Union and a part of Transylvania to Hungary. My countrymen did not like that, and needing a scapegoat, they picked on me and booted me out. It was altogether unjust. For I had done all in my power to save Rumania by pleasing Hitler. In 1937 I appeased, on his orders, the fascist, pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic Iron Guard by appointing as Premier the violently reactionary and anti-Semitic Goga. In February, 1938, I myself assumed dictatorial power and formed a one-party state. In 1939 I paid a visit to Hitler and arranged a new trade treaty with Germany. On April 25, 1940,

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I granted amnesty to all the Iron Guardists, whom I had doublecrossed because Hitler wanted it. Soon afterwards I negotiated with the Iron Guard for the purpose of forming a full-fledged totalitarian regime favorable to the Axis. On June 21, 1940, as soon as my old ally France fell, I formed the new 'Party of the Nation' with Iron Guard support. I even appealed to my people to change their entire mental attitude and accept the 'New Order.' My friend, Iron Guard leader Horia Sima, had only praise for me. Did he not say that 'the King's new party will enable us to face the future'? But for some mysterious reason all my efforts were in vain. The Nazis distrusted me, and the Iron Guardists deserted me as soon as the going got tough. I had tried my best to please Hitler and the Iron Guard. I am very sorry about all this now."

Do Carol's publicity men tell us this? No. They insist that he was the first monarch to fight fascism openly. If this were true, why would Carol need the services of a high-powered American public-relations counsel? Why does he not rely on democratic Rumanians in exile? Because they don't want him. And neither do the people of Rumania. And neither do we.

After Thirty Years

Thirty years ago, Leo Frank, a Brooklyn Jew, was convicted of murder in Georgia, forcibly removed from jail by a party of masked men and lynched. Last week, Arthur G. Powell, a former judge of the Georgia Court of Appeals, revealed that he knew Leo Frank was innocent. He stated that he must withhold his information, which was given to him as an attorney, until "certain persons"—evidently involved in the case—are dead.

The case, which attracted national attention, centered about the murder of Mary Phagan who worked in a pencil factory, in Atlanta, of which Frank was the secretary. The most shocking aspect of the case is the fact that so many persons connected with it knew all along that Frank was innocent. A. M. Roan, the trial judge who charged the jury, had told Powell "this man's innocence is proved to mathematical certainty," while John M. Slaton, Governor of Georgia at the time of the trial, was also convinced of Frank's innocence, but refused to pardon him, according to Powell's testimony, because "he realized that unless he let Frank be hanged he would forfeit all his political popularity and ambitions."

These revelations will not bring an innocent man back to life. But there is no reason why Powell's information should be withheld until "certain persons" go to the grave, presumably with blood on their hands, or guilty knowledge in their minds. Former Governor Slaton is still alive. How he knew that Frank was innocent should at once be brought to light in a review of the entire case.

Why Should Mosley Go Free?

From across the ocean, it is difficult to surmise what may have led the British government to release Sir Oswald Mosely, an out-and-out Fascist who was doing his best, at the time of his imprisonment, to duplicate Hitler's career. It is said that he is ill; but there are prison hospitals, and other prisoners are not set free merely because of impaired health. Judging from the dispatches, British opinion is deeply angered by the action. Labor, in particular, has made public protest. We hope for its own sake that the British government has some better explanation than has thus far been vouchsafed, and will make it public with the least possible delay. The argument that he has never been tried and should be released for this reason seems a specious one. Why not try him promptly, instead of giving him tacit endorsement by setting him free?

The Rail Wage Fight

On the question of a wage increase for non-operating railway employees, the Senate again is showing its willingness to be a party to special-interest legislation. It has been no secret around Washington that even the usually tight-fisted War Labor Board protested Economic Stabilizer Vinson's ruling against the eight-cents-an-hour pay boost these railroad workers have been demanding. Vinson thought that such an increase was unjustifiable in view of the hold-the-line policy. Maybe he was right; maybe not. Congress is now looking favorably on a joint resolution introduced

Seibel in The Richmond Times-Dispatch

"Last to Leave the Ark"

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by Senator Truman and Representative Crosser which would abrogate Vinson's veto and allow the eight-cent increase. A Senate subcommittee has already reported favorably on the bill. The railway unions are so well organized politically that it is possible that Congress will enact this proposed legislation. If it does, it will have undermined the stabilization authority vested in Vinson. Such action would be a sign to all other groups denied wage increases by Vinson to take their appeal over his head to Congress. It is hard to see how our present wage-stabilization machinery can stand up much longer if we continue to undermine it in this fashion.

Congress and the Cabinet

WHAT WOULD YOU give to hear Secretary Ickes in a debate with Hamilton Fish on the floor of Congress? Or Howard Smith badgering Secretary Perkins? Or a full-dress exchange between Senator Wheeler and Secretary Cordell Hull on the Moscow Pact? These open up vistas which are not beyond the bounds of possibility. For the recent formal appearance of Secretary Hull before both Houses on his return from Moscow has brought once more to public attention the old and ever new proposal that members of the Cabinet appear before Congress to answer questions and take part in debate on them.

The idea is generally known as the Pendleton plan, after Representative (later Senator) Pendleton of Ohio who first introduced it in 1864. It has since cropped up every ten or fifteen years, been warmly supported by such men as President Garfield when he was a congressman, and President Taft, and been invariably rejected or ignored by Congress itself.

The case for it is in many respects persuasive. Congress and the executive departments are generally separated by a chasm of outlook and interest. One is elective, the other, appointive; one represents local viewpoints, the other, national; one wants to get things aired, the other wants to get them done; one has access to the people, the other has information. Today more than ever, with the tasks of government growing more complex and technical, the focus of government has shifted to the executive. Since many congressmen feel frustrated and out of touch with things, they tend to wreak their frustrations on bills which the President supports, and they rip their way through the non-military appropriations for essential domestic tasks and social services like a Texas cyclone.

It is argued that simply by changing its rules, and without the need for a constitutional amendment, Congress could remedy much of this. For example, when a group of Senators made the hard trip around the far-flung American battlefronts, and came back with notes and queries that showed they had been a group of innocents abroad, Congress rushed into secret session to hear them, accusations were hurled, dramatic press conferences were held. Why could not the Senators simply have put their queries about Lend-Lease, the OWI, postwar air channels and the Siberian bases to the appropriate Cabinet members and agency heads, and allowed them to debate their answers in Congress? In short, why can we not build a bridge across the chasm that separates Congress from the executive departments?

But the proposal raises difficulties that have not thus far been sufficiently discussed. It would mean putting a premium on a certain type of Cabinet officer or agency head—the kind that can do well in a dramatic debate, or else the kind that stands in well with Congress. Since the best administrative abilities are not likely to be either forensic or political, we should run the danger of sacrificing a good administrator to a histrionic figure, or a liberal technician to a congressional fellow traveler. The President might soon find himself selecting most of his Cabinet officers from Congress; and the Cabinet heads might find themselves using their dramatic congressional appearances as a forum for their presidential hopes. Thus the process that spanned the chasm between the Cabinet and Congress might create a chasm between the President and his whole administrative mechanism.

There is also the danger—perhaps a lesser one—that the plan might represent an enormous time waste. The experience of the French with their parliamentary *interpellations*, and of the House of Commons with its "question hour," indicates that the questions put by legislators are numerous and often trivial. Today they consume the time of committee members but not of Congress as a whole, of minor administrators but not generally of Cabinet officials.

To raise these objections does not mean to reject the plan. We do it mainly to point out, as Harold Laski has done at length in his first-rate study, "The American Presidency" (1940), that this change would not mean merely a gloss on the surface of our government. It would mean a far-reaching change, which would take from the President much of the control he now exercises over the administrative process, and shift the focus of government much further to Congress. It would introduce some aspects of the Cabinet system, without the organic quality and the centering of responsibility which makes the Cabinet system work.

On the whole it would seem to us best to make greater efforts to improve our present system of presidential government. There must be better and more frequent contacts between the executive officers and Congress. There must be clearer channels of information running from the executive to congressmen and to congressional committees. It is better to work along these lines than to make a change whose consequences are not intended.

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Boundaries in the Peace

THE ANNOUNCEMENT by Secretary Hull that boundary questions were not settled at the Moscow Conference and will not be decided until after the war is over and an international organization is established, seems to us good sense. In this respect boundary disputes differ from almost all the fundamental issues of the war, which do need to be considered, and at least advanced far toward settlement, before peace overtakes us.

In the first instance, this is a war not to establish new boundaries, but to repel Axis aggression which has sought to extend the boundaries of the German, Italian and Japanese empires. As far as this issue is concerned, the natural and simple conclusion would be to reëstablish the boundaries which existed when that aggression began. The old frontiers may not be the best conceivable, and in some instances it may be impossible to restore them; but such questions should not be resolved except in the light of the nature of the peace which it is the purpose of the Allies to construct.

During and after the last war, great stress was laid on redrawing of boundaries, and even on the creation of a whole new series of states according to the principle of "self-determination." From this experience much can be learned. First, by the very nature of the issue, concentration on boundaries emphasizes concepts of national sovereignty and the differences between nations, whereas what the world needs is an abatement of nationalism and the creation of transnational institutions which will render boundaries of minor importance. Second, whereas a war coalition can coöperate successfully in almost every other realm, bitter disputes about boundaries are bound to make rifts among its members. Third, it is impossible to draw such boundaries as will settle any question which gives rise to the disputes about them.

If the effort is to detach national or racial minorities from states that are alien to them, new national or racial minorities are found within the territories that are detached, so mixed are the populations of Europe. A boundary conceived as including a homogeneous population will frequently be undesirable from a strategic or administrative point of view, or may cut across a region that should be an economic unit. The reverse is also true. For example, it is impossible to draw a boundary between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia which does not either include Czechs in Germany or Sudeten Germans in Czecho-Slovakia, one which, if war is a possibility, does not seem to threaten one nation or the other, and one which does not include in one of them economic resources on which the other is dependent. The remedy for this situation therefore cannot be a better boundary, and of course it cannot be the conquest of one of the nations by the other. It must be sought in an entirely different direction.

We in North America have a history which throws a good deal of light on this problem. At the beginning there were many boundary disputes among the states: at one time there was a bitter struggle between Vermont and New York, for instance. We nearly went to war with England over the line between Oregon and British Columbia; President Polk was elected on the slogan, "Fifty-four Forty or Fight," and probably would have carried it into effect if he had not become involved in a war with Mexico for the possession of California. We are a great congeries of racial and national minorities, even of minorities from the contiguous nations situated on our northern and southern borders.

The reason it now seems absurd to think of fighting about any of these matters, or even of trying to deal with them through boundary changes, is that we have wiped out economic barriers within the country and to a large extent between us and Canada and Mexico; we have legally guaranteed the rights of minorities—not always fully, but to a sufficient degree to avoid serious external trouble—and we have allayed any fear of military aggression which would make everyone concerned worry about strategic frontiers.

Of course the situation in Europe differs in some essential respects, and though the same principles apply, detailed measures of a different kind may have to be used. In stubborn cases, it may be advisable, for instance, to resort to the drastic expedient of wholesale exchange of populations, as the Greeks and the Turks did after their last war. But before such ticklish problems are considered, it is of the utmost importance to see what can be done to draw the nations closer together, instead of emphasizing their differences. This should be the answer to the insistent propagandists for European nationalities, who are now so vocal among us.

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Free France Goes Left

THE RESIGNATION of General Henri Honoré Giraud as co-chairman of the French Committee of National Liberation is more than a personal triumph for General Charles de Gaulle. It symbolizes the strength of the democratic idea within the Committee. It represents the ascendency of civilian over military authority. It testifies to the vitality of the resistance movement in continental France and its increasing influence on the politics of the Committee in Algiers. It paves the way for an early clarification of the international status of the French Committee. As a matter of fact, the political demise of General Giraud and his immediate followers on the Committee signalizes a new beginning in French politics. There is no place for the man who, when asked to disavow Vichy, could only say, "I do not go in for politics."

Attempts will undoubtedly be made to explain the recent changes in the composition of the French Committee of National Liberation in terms of the traditional French addiction to political intrigue, behind-the-scenes wire-pulling and factional personalism. These elements were probably present, but certainly did not constitute the determining factor in the Committee's reorganization. The reconstituted Committee reflects the dissatisfaction of underground France, organized in the resistance movement, with the secondary role apparently assigned to France by the Allied powers. This dissatisfaction was nurtured on the reluctant recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation by Great Britain and the United States, Allied hesitancy in admitting the Committee to participation in political decisions regarding Italy and the silence of the Moscow Conference as to the part which France is expected to play in the future of Europe. The ouster of General Giraud and his followers from the political scene effectively demonstrates the emancipation of the Committee from Anglo-American sponsorship.

The moral strength of the newly constituted French Committee derives from the indisputable fact that it represents the resistance movement inside occupied France. The de Gaullist claim that the former tank general is the leader of the French people has been confirmed by the speed with which the new Consultative Assembly enforced the resignation of General Giraud. The Assembly convened on November 3. Three days later General Giraud resigned. There is overwhelming evidence that his resignation was the immediate result of pressure exerted by the representatives of the French underground in the Assembly. And there is a further consideration which should silence those who have raised the cry of "Bonapartism" over the alleged dictatorial aspirations of de Gaulle. For if the resistance movement succeeded in compelling the withdrawal of Giraud from politics, it can be expected to control the actions of de Gaulle as well.

However, the reorganization of the French Committee did not entirely eliminate all former Vichyites. The most conspicuous example is the continued presence in the Committee of René Massigli as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. Massigli, a former French Ambassador to Turkey, lived on a Vichy pension until he was brought out of France by the British and foisted on the Committee under the pretext that it had need of an experienced career diplomat. Relations between the conservative and pro-Giraud Massigli and the de Gaullists have been strained in the past and may be expected to remain unsatisfactory in the future. The struggle between Massigli and the de Gaullists may well come to a head when the Committee meets to discuss the recent purges of de Gaullists from important positions in the French diplomatic and consular corps in the United States and their replacement by former Vichy officials.

One of the major arguments against full recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation by Great Britain and the United States has been that it would prejudice the establishment of a government in France based upon the wishes of the French people. Indeed, if this argument were equally advanced with respect to all the governments-in-exile, nobody could quarrel with it. But it so happens that it was exclusively applied to the French Committee. It was never even mentioned in official circles in connection with the recognition of the Badoglio farce in Italy. But with the reorganization of the Algiers Committee and the inclusion of members of the resistance movement, full recognition cannot be delayed much longer. The French Committee of National Liberation has become as representative as, if not more so, than the sundry exiled governments in London and Cairo.

Much has been made of the fact, especially in some circles of exiled Frenchmen in the United States, that the Consultative Assembly has no status under the laws of the Third Republic and hence represents a travesty on Republican traditions. This insistence on an empty legalism overlooks the revolutionary character of the events in France and in North Africa. The French resistance movement in the German-occupied Vichy territory has no legal status under the laws of the Third Republic either, and yet it has probably more authority and prestige among Frenchmen than the puppet Vichy regime. Moreover, nobody claims legal origins for the Consultative Assembly. It is a frankly revolutionary body that includes forty

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members from the underground resistance movement and its popular representativeness under conditions which make elections impossible is beyond doubt.

The Consultative Assembly is predominantly leftist in composition. This character derives not so much from the fact that it includes such old party wheelhorses as the Socialists Vincent Auriol, Pierre Bloch or Felix Gouin, and the Communists André Marty, Ferdinand Grenier or André Mercier, but rather that the overwheming majority of the resistance movement in continental France is leftist. The French underground movement is well organized in the Council of Resistance, a group of sixteen men who chiefly belong to former parties of the Left or labor unions. However, only the Socialists and Communists appear as actually reconstituted parties. From what little is known, the Council of Resistance has considerable influence in Algiers. One of its leaders, François de Menthon, is now Commissioner of Justice in the French Committee of National Liberation. His selection for this post symbolizes more than anything else the determined opposition of the French people to the Vichy regime.

As Commissioner of Justice, M. de Menthon is the trustee of popular opposition to Vichy in North Africa where the purges of former Vichyites may be expected to accelerate with the reorganization of the Committee of National Liberation. Again it is important to emphasize that these purges do not constitute a reign of terror, but are a manifestation of the will of the French people to make a clean sweep of its Vichy past. However, the new leftist trend in Free French politics does not mean Communist domination of the Committee in Algiers. The strength and effectiveness of the Communist Party in the metropolitan resistance movement entitles it to a prominent role on the Committee. But the protracted negotiations between de Gaulle and the Communist Party also suggest that the Communists had to maneuver for position. Their earlier demand for the important post of Commissioner of Information was firmly rejected. They have settled for the two Commissariats of Production and Commerce, and Public Health and Education. Lucien Midol and Etienne Fajon, both former Communist deputies to the pre-war parliament, were nominated for these posts. The participation of the Communist Party in the Committee undoubtedly adds to its strength and representativeness.

The reorganization of the French Committee of National Liberation also symbolizes the resurgence of revolutionary nationalism among the French people. When, in the fateful summer of 1940, General de Gaulle addressed himself to beaten, prostrate and desperate France with the words, "France has lost a battle; France has not lost a war," he spoke to a people which in a century of bourgeois comfort and cosmopolitan civilization had forgotten its revolutionary heritage and its will to national existence. Three years under the Nazi heel have brought about a moral regeneration which may well become the decisive factor in the future of European politics. Until now the leaders of the Allied powers, while promising the restoration of France as one of the "great powers"—according to Mr. Churchill, "a sacred duty from which Great Britain will never turn"—have not indicated *how* they intend to implement this promise after the war. There has been considerable apprehension among the smaller nations over the failure of the Moscow conference to make any suggestions concerning the role they are expected to play in the post-war world. General de Gaulle, now speaking with more authority than ever as the voice of France, is rapidly becoming the uncrowned spokesman of the smaller nations and of a progressive Europe. His speech at the opening of the Consultative Assembly, while mentioning only the French Committee of National Liberation which "now claims the right to present, with the great nations, the solutions that France judges necessary to the settlement of this war and the organization of the world to come," was in effect a collective plea for a free Europe.

But what about the recent unfortunate events in Lebanon? Are the short-sighted, strong-arm measures applied by the French in repressing native unrest not contrary to everything the Committee of National Liberation stands for? The French Delegate General in Lebanon, Jean Helleu, has stated that he acted on orders from the Committee against his advice. General de Gaulle, on the other hand, has declared that he did not believe "that France, and even more so the new France, can be suspected of seeking to harm the cause of liberty wherever it may be found or of seeking to retard it wherever it may be necessary that it should appear." What, then, was the reason for the Committee's action? There is some strong evidence that the unilateral and impatient step of the Lebanese parliament in voting virtual independence was encouraged by the British-supported Pan-Arabian movement in an attempt to embarrass the French Committee in its dealings with the Arabs not only in the Near East, but also in North Africa. In this contest of old-fashioned power politics the French Committee, nationalistic as much as leftist, had no alternative but to resort to outmoded colonial methods in coping with the Lebanese situation. Could it be that the British were trying to fish in troubled waters? What other explanation can there be of the ironical appeal of Lebanese leaders for British intervention? In the end, the Committee may prove that it is more sensitive to the democratic aspirations of the colonial peoples than the British. Its first positive steps point in this direction. It has freed the arrested government leaders, reinstated the Lebanese President, recalled the Delegate General and declared its readiness to open negotiations implementing the promise of independence. The Committee may indeed justify the claim that France is ready to become again a vital force in world policies.

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

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Those Long-Haired Professors

ONE OF OUR VOCAL CONGRESSMEN not long ago described non-business men in government as "long-haired visionaries and crackpots with half-baked ideas." When Leon Henderson was at the head of the OPA, he was, in the eyes of Congress and business alike, the leader of this lunatic fringe, a major characteristic of which group was, according to the press and radio, that none had ever met a payroll. Henderson's incapacity was said to be so great that the innocent bystander might well have concluded that once out of government he would have to depend on the dole for sustenance since he could not hope to hold down a job.

The pressure forced Mr. Henderson out of his allegedly easy government berth, and simultaneously business underwent a seemingly miraculous conversion. They deluged the "crackpot" Henderson with offers of jobs. Not just running an elevator or watching a factory gate either, but responsible, policy-making positions paying salaries far into the upper brackets. Henderson, while in government, was continuously assailed as the spearhead of those who wanted to do away with all advertising. But take a look at this announcement in Printers' Ink, a journal of the advertising business: "Leon Henderson, former head of Office of Price Administration, has joined the Biow Company, New York, as economic consultant. The former stormy petrel of Washington has joined the advertising profession."

Henderson, the New Dealer, was, according to hundreds of editorials, for confiscatory taxes which threatened the very cornerstone of free enterprise. Yet he had not yet shaken off the dust of government office when the Research Institute of America, wholesale dispenser of tax guidance for business, offered him the chairmanship of the board of its editorial publications.

In the not so distant days, whatever Henderson had to say was subversive or almost so; now O'Sullivan's rubber heels proudly announces that it sponsors Leon Henderson as a commentator over a national radio network. Add it up. Henderson now holds down three jobs, chosen from the many offered him just as soon as business and Congress together had succeeded in forcing him out of government. As far as I know he's the same man and hasn't wavered one bit from the ideas he held when he was damned up hill and down dale as a long-haired professor.

Curiously, Henderson's quick progress from untouchable to the darling of business is typical of what has been happening right along. Professors, described by the press as dreamers, brain-trusters and incapable of understanding business right up to the day their forced exit from government is announced, are immediately offered lucrative jobs by business. When the professor accepts the job, the company which hired him proudly blazons the fact that it has been lucky enough to land the academician. Who's looney now? Truth is that the professors demonstrate their worth to business when they do a good job for government. But as far as the interests of business are concerned, the professor is working the other side of the street when he is in government and consequently is the butt for attack. Truth is also that professors, particularly in this technological age, are at home in every phase of business.

Elihu Thomson, one-time professor of Chemistry and Mechanics, was a founder of General Electric and until his retirement was actively associated with its management. Prof. Robert E. Wilson, formerly of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is chairman of the board of the huge Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company and president of the American Oil Company. Dr. Frank B. Jewett, alumnus of the MIT faculty, holder of more than a dozen degrees, president of the learned and scholarly National Academy of Sciences, is chairman of the board of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Leo H. Baekeland, professor in Belgian universities, came to this country and founded, from scratch, the brand-new industry of plastics. Not only did he amass a huge fortune from his management of the company making Bakelite, his invention, but he set the stage for the success of the Eastman Kodak Company.

But all these are professors of the physical sciences, and the brunt of the attack is borne by economists and social scientists. The record here is no different. Willard Thorp, professor of Economics at Amherst College till 1935, and for some time part of a New Deal agency in Washington, is now editor of Dun's Review and trustee of Associated Gas and Electric. Nearly everyone knows about Raymond Moley, one-time professor and later hated brain-truster, who now edits Newsweek but still brain-trusts; as witness this collection of four freedoms, recently announced as his own by Moley in a speech to advertising agents: (1) freedom from regimentation; (2) freedom from confiscatory taxes; (3) freedom from class government; (4) freedom from government propaganda.

Clearly professors do all right in business and when they are part of it enjoy the respect of their less academic brethren. Is, then, the widespread contempt shown in the press and in Congress for professors a truly felt emotion? "Bowles drops three professors in OPA cabinet—Acts to get along with business." That's a recent front-page headline in the sometimes erudite

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New York Herald Tribune. An unnamed Harvard professor is quoted in the paid advertisement of a textile trade paper as having said that the paper was reactionary. "Perhaps to this particular professor the ——— paper is reactionary—and we're proud of it," says the advertisement, more than implying that the dislike of a professor for the publication becomes incontrovertible proof that it must be working in the best interests of the industry.

No one ever heard of a business man, much less a congressman, turning down an honorary degree, even though offered by an ever so humble fresh-water college. Business men make up the majority of those on the boards of colleges, and vie with one another to get elected as trustees. In the many university clubs in the big cities, one rarely stumbles into a professor. The congestion in the seats at the windows is caused by business men. Given an opportunity to lecture to an evening class in marketing, advertising and such like, even a tycoon jumps at the chance to become a part-time professor and tread the hallowed halls under the ivory tower. Finally, men who have made their mark and their mint in business achieve their hearts' desire when, like Paul Cornell, called the greatest copywriter of yesterday, or William B. Benton, chairman of the board of Benton and Bowles, outstanding advertising agency, they retire from business to become a part of the scholastic world. Cornell heads a boys' school and Benton is vice-president of the University of Chicago.

Look deeper. The contempt is not truly felt. There is some envy. But envy is not the motivating force for the unprecedented vigor with which the professors are assailed. More reasonably its roots could be in an attempt to destroy the professor because of his trained objectivity. Sitting in Washington, he is neither the spokesman for business nor for any other special interest. He approaches a problem with knowledge of the theory and reaches a conclusion which is logical. Business men congenitally confuse theory and fact and, thinking that facts are theories, honestly disagree with the findings. Particularly when the findings hurt financially. Since much of what is done in Washington, particularly in agencies such as the OPA, is of a semi-judicial character, the professor's decisions are bound to cause enmities. The business man and, more vocally, Congress gang up to oust the umpire. In the case of the OPA, their campaign was flagrantly symptomatic of their real desires. Wanting, more than anything else, decisions favorable to the financial and competitive positions of business, Congress passed a law forbidding the employment of anyone in a key position in the OPA unless he is "qualified by experience in business, industry or commerce." The net result of this legislation is that, from here on, business men will be judged by an *ex-parte* jury of business men, which is a good deal like decreeing that court cases in which tenants sue landlords shall never be tried by a jury on which anyone but a landlord sits.

Editors, radio commentators, congressmen and industry associations carry on a tireless campaign to make the term "professor" synonymous with "red."

"Subversive" is another common label. "Incompetent" is another. Here business men, barging into Washington, being kept waiting by professors who do not speak their occupational patter, have most cause for irritation. They have not understood each other readily, these two. To make matters worse, more times than not the professor, brought into a government agency because of his proficiency in a specialized job, has been given important administrative responsibilities for which he had no proficiency at all. The professor's answer to this has been to bring in more of his own kind to help him unravel the knots, only to become more enmeshed. That's serious—but it's not the professor's fault and the blame for it lies not on his shoulders but higher up. Incidentally, the professors have had no more and no less trouble with the burdens of administration than business men who, as sales, advertising or production men, had an equal lack of administrative experience. But to them this ineptitude must be more becoming, for Congress and the press never mention their failures.

Nor do they mention the successes of the professors —and they are many. This is in a very real sense a professors' war. From the electronic device which saved England from the Nazi blitz, to planning water supply and sanitation for occupied territory, professors are in it. They translate enemy communications, map whole areas, and teach navigation and astronomy to aviators. They do a thousand things without which the war could not be won, and among these the foremost is planning, that word which in civil government is made to sound so subversive. Curious, isn't it, that all the heat is turned on the professors to get them out of one part of government, when in a measure, our security depends on them as they function in another part of government.

Doubly curious, in the light of the postwar world. Radio, television, air travel, electronics, plastics, penicillin—our brave new world is to be based on the achievements of professors. Du Pont already employs a small army of scientists, ranging from marketing specialists through chemical engineers. The Mellons support a technical institute for the good of industry. And this is only the beginning. The postwar industrial world has equal need for economists and social scientists and the industrialists know it. Characteristically, they go on, inciting the entire nation to scorn—and worse—of professors so that little victories can be achieved to their immediate benefit.

Perhaps, since they hire the long-haired professors who are, by their pressure, kicked out of government, they feel that they are still saving the goose that lays the golden egg.

A. G. MEZERIK

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The New Anti-Alien Drive

At the pace Congress has been setting, we may come to regard the alien and sedition laws as the keystone of our civil liberties. Whatever else may be the shortcomings of the Capitol Hill assemblage, a rare unity has been achieved these days between Yankee industrialist and Southern bourbon, between Chicago Tribune lovers and Texas internationalists, between Republicans and Democrats. Whatever sectional or party lines separate our modern-day tories on other issues, they stand firm against the "impending invasion" of the United States by anti-fascist foreigners—particularly the ideas of these foreigners.

After numerous false starts the country is on the brink of a violent anti-alien campaign that will overshadow anything since the halcyon days of the Ku Klux Klan. It will undoubtedly carry over to the 1944 presidential campaign. All this despite the fact that there has been virtually no wartime immigration.

The first evidence of the new offensive against Hitler's hapless victims came during the debate on the Chinese Exclusion Act. Although the Dies Committee seems to have been shoved into the background, the old spirit was there. Rep. William P. Elmer of Missouri helped set the pace when he direly warned that, "This measure, innocuous as it seems, is an attempt to put the camel's nose under the tent of our immigration laws, because in the offing we know that there is a bill pending to bring into this country millions of aliens from foreign countries under the pretext that they are to be here just for the duration and six months later. But once you get them in you will never get them out." Representative Elmer asked, no doubt recalling portrayals of the Chinese as veritable Fu Manchus, "When did the Chinese devils become Chinese saints?"

But the Chinese debate was just a warm-up for the main event. The main feature is to be a prolonged assault on the Office of War Information with evidence —much of it spurious—to show that its Overseas Division is infested with "aliens" and Communists.

The strategists of the Hearst and Patterson-McCormick newspapers, who supplement the work of congressional alien-baiters, employ different tactics. Hearst, die-hard that he is, still veers to the anti-Communist bogey; the Chicago Tribune-New York Daily News approach more frequently is on the straight anti-alien line. This difference is said to run deep, with Hearst regarding the Pattersons, in particular, as wild Trotskyists in the anti-democratic camp; while Joe Patterson is said to consider Hearst as old-fashioned, crude and unsophisticated.

However that may be, the major anti-alien offensive against the OWI has begun with the OWI's appeal for a $5,000,000 deficiency appropriation. For about two months prior to its request, the "softening-up" process went into operation. John O'Donnell, idea man on The New York Daily News, opened up the propaganda barrage with the observation on September 13 that "you can expect to hear some highly interesting evidence on what our foreign propaganda bureau of the Office of War Information has been telling the populations of Europe—particularly the Germans." This sally appeared to be a little premature and someone fed Danton Walker, who writes a column called "Broadway," an item which he ran on October 4. "An investigation is brewing in the Overseas Office of the OWI in the U. S.," Walker wrote, wandering off the Great White Way, "said to be loaded with aliens and non-citizens."

O'Donnell, in the role of political seer, continued the build-up on October 25 when he predicted, "Within a week or ten days you will be hearing some very interesting statements on Capitol Hill about the high cost of the OWI's 'psychological warfare'—that idiot brain child sired by Archibald MacLeish and now supported by the taxpayers by cash turned over to foster-father Elmer Davis of OWI."

Walker, apparently not aware that he had been scooped, printed this tip on October 29: "Congressional investigation of the OWI, due to make the front pages within eight or ten days, will criticize the well intentioned but mistaken championship of Mrs. Roosevelt of certain OWI elements."

With this neat bit of psychological warfare accomplished, Congress went to work on November 4. Had the Moscow Conference not interfered, there is no doubt that the House debate would have hit the headlines, certainly in some papers. The attack was mainly centered on the fact that the OWI had signed a contract with an organization known as Short-Wave Research, Inc., to help arrange broadcasts to foreign countries—and surprisingly, has employed citizens of these countries, experienced in domestic affairs, to help prepare scripts. Special objection was made to the use of German Social-Democrats belonging to the Neu Beginnen group, although not quite as much was made of this as O'Donnell had predicted.

Representative Wigglesworth described Short-Wave Research, Inc., as an "organization created to circumvent the law, an organization which took 10 percent for its own service, paying the bulk of the balance in salaries to so-called charities in this country, such as the Friends of German Freedom, probably without authority." He also painted a horrendous picture of 417 aliens working for the OWI in June, with the number now increased to 486, and said that "many of these aliens were refugees from abroad."

The fact was that Col. William Donovan, the former

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Coördinator of Information, had made the original arrangements with Short-Wave Research, Inc. However, this did not thwart the alien-baiters from trying to prove their main contention, that the OWI was broadcasting revolutionary propaganda abroad, though the worst they could find was Samuel Grafton's reference to Victor Emmanuel as the "moronic little King." Remarks about alien influence were frequent until Rep. Clarence Cannon of Missouri, who waged a brilliant counter-offensive, rose to read a list of 27 aliens—with four and five-syllable names—only to disclose that these were American boys who had been killed fighting overseas. This took some of the wind out of the tories' sails, but not for long. Rep. Martin T. Bennett of Missouri could not refrain from observing that "In brief, Mr. Chairman, the OWI stinks." This was an extension of his remarks in The Congressional Record.

Momentarily set back by statements from General Marshall and General Eisenhower that the OWI's Overseas branch had been useful to the military in the initial stages of the Battle of Italy, the alien-baiters reformed their lines on the second day of debate, this time employing the anti-Communist technique. The House was flooded with stories about the influx of Communists into the OWI. This finally boiled down to the fact that of some 2,000 persons who had been checked by Military and Naval Intelligence, the FBI, Civil Service and the OWI's own security agency, only six were recommended for dismissal as Communists. The figure is undoubtedly too small, but it is fairly certain that Communists occupy no policy-making posts in the OWI.

While the groundwork was laid in the Chinese debate and in the agitation against the OWI, it is for bigger game that the alien-baiters are hunting. Those who specialize in the study of congressional trends on immigration and related questions believe that the full-scale offensive will be opened up against the resolution introduced by Rep. Will Rogers on November 9—H. R. 352. Having once successfully cowed the State Department into permitting virtually nothing to come out of the Bermuda Conference on refugee problems, the alien-baiters will fight Rogers' resolution tooth and nail as paving the way for a relaxation of immigration bars. The whispering campaign has already been started. For the record it should be made clear that Rogers, who went to England at the request of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, has merely recommended the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic and military experts to formulate a plan of immediate action designed to "save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany."

One other development in the anti-alien field is worth observation. Gerald L. K. Smith, leader of the America First party, is reported to have adopted an entirely new technique. He is attempting to enlist in his organization all the anti-Soviet Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and White Russians living in the Middle West.

ROBERT G. SPIVACK

Has Wendell Willkie Lost?

Political scouts for both parties are now reporting that it was Wendell Willkie who lost the recent state elections. Their dope sheets check on the point that Republican regulars are now convinced they can win in 1944 with any candidate who can talk and that they do not have to swallow any such "radical" as Willkie in order to lick Roosevelt.

The Gallup poll and other surveys are showing the same trend. When Gallup polled Republicans on their choice between Willkie and Dewey, the national vote was 35 percent for Willkie, 55 percent for Dewey, and 10 percent undecided.

But public-opinion polls have not yet replaced the smoke-filled hotel room for choosing presidential candidates. Joe Pew and Lammot du Pont still pack more wallop in the Republican Party than George Gallup. And it is no secret that these gentlemen and their closer political pals are not throwing their weight in Willkie's direction, even though they backed him in 1940. It is their money and their determination to lick Willkie that may stop the Republicans from licking Roosevelt. They may split their own party instead.

John D. M. Hamilton, former chairman of the Republican National Committee, is just winding up a nationwide tour to line up anti-Willkie delegations to the Republican national convention. Hamilton does not deny that Joe Pew is paying his bills. Reports on his visits to Republican leaders, state by state, slide into a simple pattern. His line is that Willkie is unreliable, a disrupter. First job is to block him out. That agreed, Hamilton and his backers are prepared to be reasonable. Take your choice, Hamilton says, of a whole stable of potential candidates: Dewey, Bricker, MacArthur—or somebody else. We will agree on that little detail later. Meanwhile line up your state Republican delegation and pledge it to your Favorite Son.

Hamilton's hosts are generally assuming that they can rely on his backers for small things like expenses. Many of them have done so before. Pew and du Pont and some of du Pont's friends who have been most active in the National Association of Manufacturers did their 1944 political planning early. Pew, for example, contributed at least $5,000 in 1942 to every Republican state organization that needed money. That

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was most of them, and that kind of practice gave Pew and his friends a good-sized mortgage on the Republican Party in states like Nebraska and the Dakotas. It is going to be hard for those state organizations to refuse to come through for the Pew-du Pont ticket while those gentlemen continue to hold the mortgage. There is always, however, a bare chance that virtue may triumph, and the same goes for Willkie.

Joe Pew also owns The Farm Journal, one of the most widely circulated rural sheets. Its editor, Wheeler McMillan, has been very busy at the Grange convention which has just met in Grand Rapids, Michigan, selling Pew's brand of Republican politics with considerable success. The careful work Dewey did with Midwestern farmers in the last campaign is still paying off there to Willkie's disadvantage. A private poll of the thirty-eight state Grange Masters at the convention showed almost no support for Willkie, strongest support for Dewey.

But the drive by many different groups of Republicans to neutralize the foreign-policy issue in the '44 campaign is more damaging to Willkie's chances than any of these conditions. In the Senate, Robert A. Taft has urged that a general foreign policy be accepted by all groups. One that is couched in good words and seems to promise everything but actually promises nothing. Clarence Budington Kelland, America Firster and Republican National Committeeman from Arizona, has proposed that there be identical foreign planks in the Democratic and Republican platforms. John Bricker has stated flatly that "there must be responsible participation among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."

The language of these pronouncements sounds very much like the Republican promises of 1920, when international issues were also of prime importance. Then, too, the majority of Americans favored our participation in an international organization as they do now. The Republican candidates, Governor Lowden, General Wood and Senator Harding, all endorsed the League of Nations in some form or other. Two weeks before the election, thirty-one Republican leaders issued a joint statement that: "This is not a question of a League or no League. The Republican Party is in all good faith and good will bound to pursue this cause until it is fulfilled."

But in spite of all the promises, the Republicans did not fulfill the obligation. Harding swore that he was for the principles of the League but on the night of his election he gloated, over his triumphal bonfire, that "the League is dead and no one seems to be sorry." The man and the party that had promised to support the new League repudiated it. The suspicion is spreading that the former isolationist Republicans may try the same trick again, and Willkie has been selling himself, with success, as the defender against this possibility. The anti-Willkie Republicans may be expected to associate themselves more and more closely with weak and misleading foreign-policy statements like the Connally resolution in the hope of convincing the country that there is unity on foreign policy. If the Tafts, the Vandenbergs and the McCormicks maneuver so as to take the international issue out of the campaign, many think they will practically have taken Willkie out too.

The more cautious Republicans who think the party needs Willkie's support in order to win are worried about what he might do if he lost the nomination. Would he pull a Teddy Roosevelt on them? The more candid admit that Willkie would be a fool to throw away his reputation by putting his seal of approval on a gold-brick foreign policy. Most of the men who will do the nominating, however, are already a little drunk on the prospect of victory and are not troubled by any such chilling thoughts as these.

The Wheeler-Reynolds-Gerald L. K. Smith promise of a "strong third party" in the event of a Republican-Democrat agreement on a foreign-policy plank is being taken lightly so far by both parties. The Democrats did notice, however, that Philadelphia's Republican machine gave Smith the permit he needed for his recent meeting to launch his Bob Reynolds-for-President drive.

If not Willkie on the Republican ticket, then who? At this moment most bets among Republican politicians are going on Governor Thomas E. Dewey. His advantages over the many other indefinite and colorless candidates available, they say, are that he could boast of administrative experience and that he could carry New York State. Bricker has the same sort of appeal and is more attractive than Dewey to those who felt that Dewey went a little too far at Mackinac Island. If Dewey is safe, Bricker is safer, they contend.

If the Pew gang should dominate the convention it might prove to be significant that Bricker finally made the formal announcement of his candidacy just after Hamilton's visit to him in Columbus. Hamilton, however, is not talking. While he was in California recently, persuading Gov. Earl Warren to break his tentative pledge to Willkie, Hamilton told the press: "Anyone who reads the polls knows that no man up to this time has captured the public imagination to the extent of as much as one-third of the vote. In view of this," he went on, "it may not be out of place to note that the public agrees with Mr. Willkie's often-repeated phrase of the last campaign—'There is no one indispensable man'." Then he added significantly, "The Republican Party has the finest group of Governors it has ever had. Irrespective of their personal ambitions, they should all be considered on their merits."

Democratic leaders smile wryly at Hamilton's crack about no indispensable man. They know that FDR is indispensable to a Democratic victory in 1944.

Washington HELEN FULLER

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Washington Notes

Varied Matters

THOUGH ONLY AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS have I had day-to-day dealings with Cordell Hull, I share the general Washington feeling of amused attachment for the veteran statesman. Mr. Hull has a mild, benign face with a touch of nobility in it, and his hesitating manner, circumlocutions and curious difficulties with the "r" sound rouse that feeling of possessive interest which one finds so irritating when Arthur Krock puts it in one of his columns, as though the Secretary were a limited-liability company and Mr. Krock owned half the shares. Mr. Hull had an hour-and-a-half press conference on his return from Moscow, and his assurance that there had been "no secret agwee-ments" immediately ran over the Capital.

Last week Mr. Hull stood in the spotlight glare of a joint congressional session in the big, square, barnlike House chamber, packed and jammed with visitors, and was applauded as he plodded through 25 minutes of a dull speech. It was a worthy and wooden effort. To Mr. Hull a speech is a speech, and he goes through the ordeal painstakingly till he comes to the end, when he stops. Nevertheless, that same feeling of affection for the venerable figure who first came to Congress in 1907 and has just completed a 26,000-mile round trip to Moscow, was everywhere evident.

Now this feeling of affection is something to be reckoned with. It is surprising how few people rouse congressional affection. Rightly or wrongly, Congress honors Mr. Hull. The very dullness of his delivery is an asset; rhetorical flourishes from him would be out of place. The House and Senate could not agree on their rival Fulbright and Connally post-war resolutions—but when they mutually applauded Mr. Hull last week they, in effect, sank their differences. Here is one of those cases in Washington in which personalities are so very important and which are so difficult for outsiders to understand. Carping criticism of Mr. Hull that leaves out his prestige and the faith Congress has in him, is inadequate. He is a force to reckon with. And no one has ever declared that he does not represent Mr. Roosevelt.

For the better part of a week, the press and the radio have been talking about a meeting of the "big three"—Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Quite possibly definite news will be forthcoming before these words are read. Anyhow, my own advance speculation is that when this meeting occurs it will turn out to be a four-party affair, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek present.

I would also set down as a good bet that some high Russian military leader will be closely associated with the second-front cross-Channel invasion, when it comes. General Marshall will probably take over command of Anglo-American armies in London as supreme commander, before Christmas, with Lt.-Gen. Joseph McNarney—Marshall's trusted assistant—left here as acting chief of staff. Ultimately General Eisenhower will return to the Capital as chief of staff, but probably not until the Italian campaign has passed the decisive phase.

The farm bloc is now hellbent on inflation. The farmers made a grand thing out of inflation in World War I as long as the skyrocket went up, but it is interesting to recall what happened when the charred stick came down. Farmers got only $1.36 a bushel for wheat in May, 1914, but $2.51 by May, 1919. Corn sold for 78 cents a bushel in 1914 and for $1.77 in 1919. Beef cattle jumped from $6.33 to $10.38 a hundredweight; hogs soared into the economic stratosphere from $7.60 to $18; cotton leaped from 8.8 cents in May, 1915, to 37 cents in 1920.

That was inflation and that is what the farm bloc is trying to repeat now. But wait a minute. It is surprising that the sequel to the story hasn't been told more often. With boom prices, land speculation went wild, just as it is starting to do again today. Then the bubble burst. Here is the story from there on: in one crop year, May to May, hogs dropped from $18 to $7.62; wheat, $2.51 to $1.19; corn, $1.77 to 61 cents; cotton, 37.4 to 5.3 cents; beef, $10.38 to $5.98. The result was catastrophic.

It is the farmer who always gets the biggest headache after the inflation spree. The farmers had contracted debts in "little" dollars and had to pay off in "big" dollars. Average Midwest farm-acreage prices dropped by one-third, and in the Mountain states, by one-half. That is the story.

The activities of the insurance lobby are reaching the point of a first-rate scandal, and evidence is accumulating that before it is over the insurance companies may be sorry they ever launched their arrogant campaign. It began with the government's anti-trust case against Southern fire-insurance companies, a case which the Supreme Court is about to hear. But the insurance lobby doesn't want Supreme Court interference; it has railroaded a bill through the House Judiciary Committee to grab the matter away from the high court by the simple expedient of declaring the whole field of insurance a state, rather than a federal, matter. A Senate subcommittee has hastily approved the same bill, which Attorney General Biddle branded "special-privilege legislation of the worst sort." One of the richest lobbies in America is working back home, in legislators' law offices, for quick passage. If federal control is banned from one type of insurance it will be banned from all. It may turn out that the insurance companies have made a stupid move. Their position, and lobby practices, cannot stand scrutiny, and Senate opposition may dramatize the issue. Even if the bill is passed I should expect Mr. Roosevelt's prompt veto. And I don't think Congress would override.

The position of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the presidential campaign becomes more and more exasperating. Here in Washington Senator Vandenberg, who has never picked a winner, is making an ardent campaign in his behalf. There are rumors the General has emissaries of his own doing political scouting. That a general in the field should not definitely stop the use of his name for political purposes in wartime is simply intolerable. The American public is not going to elect, or forgive, a political general at this time. The very failure to stop the use of his name argues a spiritual obtuseness that unfits MacArthur for the presidency. The General must have real friends among brother officers, and they ought to tell him the facts of life.

Washington T. R. B.

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Progress Has Nothing To Do With Airplanes



EVERYBODY is astounded, these days, by the shrinking distances between continents. A radio commentator, just returned to this country, says, with more than a shade of awe in his voice . . . "yesterday morning I had breakfast in Algiers; I had supper at my club in London; I reached LaGuardia Field in time for a late lunch". . . .

Those distances will go on shrinking. But increasing the rate of speed of an airplane from two hundred to four hundred or to eight hundred miles an hour, does not in itself spell progress.

"After the war," the advertisements tell you, "you'll have a helicopter in your back yard, a walkie-talkie in your vest pocket, and a refrigerator in the kitchen with more gadgets on it than matter, the people of New York City and Seattle; to learn what they are thinking, and how we can work out a method of getting along better together.

A great many of our books are concerned with the fighting that is going on all over the world,[1] and with the technical sides of gearing ourselves for war — not only in factories, but right at home.[2] But the books that make us proudest of being publishers at this crossroad of history are not alone the books that tell how it feels to be lost in a jungle, fly a *Spitfire*, or fight the battle of the rationed dinner table — but those that ask, "Where do we go from here?" And what do we have to do, not only to win the war, but to make victory effective?

THERE ARE certain trail-blazers among our forthcoming publications which no one who wants to understand the world as it is in this fifth year of War, the path along which it has come and the path it will take, can overlook. Such books as Paul Hagen's GERMANY AFTER HITLER — which gives a candid treatment of the "German problem" (no matter what newspaper you read) to furnish a common sense, workable policy for private enterprise; it will be published in the Spring.

Books like these are seldom spectacular — and yet a book like ENGLISH COMMUNICATION: *A Handbook of Writing and Speaking* will eventually be used and consulted more widely and by more different types of people, than many books on the current best-seller lists. Or take our *Labor in Twentieth Century America* series. With a powerful bloc of congressmen, reinforced by pressure groups, yelling for labor's scalp — with many labor unions under short-sighted and occasionally corrupt leadership out for "all they can get" — somebody has to sit down calmly and make sense out of the dog-fight. That's why McAlister Coleman has made a 376-page study of the men in the coal mines. MEN AND COAL is the first book about the "men from the picks" that tells what the men who mine the coal are like, how they live, who their real leaders are, how peaceful relations can be established in the coal fields. That's why other volumes to come will deal with textiles, with iron and steel, and

ras. . . . That great series *Rivers of America* flows powerfully on, now in its seventh year, bringing this Spring a notable new volume in THE TENNESSEE.

Surely one of the high spots of this or any publishing season will be a book completed by Stephen Vincent Benét just before his death — a short history of the United States. More than anything else we can think of, it shows what Americans are fighting for.

THESE are the kinds of books which Farrar & Rinehart publish in wartime, with affection for the books themselves and pride in the country in which such publishing can go on freely, in the light of day. Farrar & Rinehart's staff of Editors is fortunate, in the selection and presentation of its books, in being able to draw on the advice and experience of a large group of Consulting Editors — writers and critics, men and women in college faculties, in business and in many other walks of life. To name only a few: John Chamberlain (labor); Blair Niles, Ernesto Montenegro, and John Dos Passos (Latin-America); Hervey Allen and

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out 'Breakfast coming up!'" (Maybe it'll do that, too.) But that won't be progress.

No, the things that really change in the world are man's capacity to understand himself and his fellow men, to organize his private life and his world a little differently than did his father and his father's father. Plato and Voltaire and Jefferson and Henry George have had a far more revolutionary impact on man's thinking than have Edison or the Wright Brothers.

Let an airplane travel ever so fast — with the speed of sound or even of light — somebody's thoughts will be travelling faster.

The annihilation of distance cannot be merely two-dimensional; it must be three-dimensional. It will serve no good purpose, but possibly an evil one, if Bucharest and Hangchow are brought within round-trip bombing range of Mitchel Field. The important thing is for us to get to know the people of Roumania and China — and for that

item" and outlines a workable plan for the completion of a democratic German revolution. Or THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION, by Karl Polanyi, in which a brilliant mind traces the collapse of the economic pillars upon which rested civilization as we have known it up to now. A book that puts its finger on the biggest question-mark in European politics today is THE RISING CRESCENT: TURKEY, by Ernest Jackh . . . And Asher Brynes in REVOLUTION COMES OF AGE draws on a study of the cataclysmic changes made in human society by this and every war, to point our task in the post-war world.



At home, nothing is of greater importance than the relationship of the worker, and of the business man, to government. John J. Corson has made the first comprehensive study of our human resources in MANPOWER FOR VICTORY. Beardsley Ruml is finishing a book that will cut through the morass of governmental "control of" "aid to" or "interference with" business (depending on rubber, with automobiles. Joel Seidman's THE NEEDLE TRADES, already published, tells the story of one industry that has really achieved stabilization in the churning field of labor relations.

TODAY'S broadened horizons have ushered in a wealth of reading opportunity in cultural as well as political fields. We wish there were space here to talk about the newest books to come to America as a result of the Latin-American Prize Contest just closing. This year's fiction winner, CANAPÉ-VERT, is a novel of Haitian black magic with more authentic chills to the page than in most of the synthetic shockers. ENRIQUETA AND I, which won the biography award, is a very human and quietly humorous book about some people who live in Hondu-

(1.) For example: MALTA SPITFIRE by *George F. Beurling and Leslie Roberts*; VICTORY AT MIDWAY, *by Lt. Commander Griffith Baily Coale*; LETTER FROM NEW GUINEA by *Vern Haugland*; REPORT ON NORTH AFRICA *by Kenneth Crawford*. (2.) THE GOOD HOUSEKEEPING COOK BOOK; INFANTS AND CHILDREN by *Frederic H. Bartlett, M.D.*; YOUR MARRIAGE by *Norman E. Himes*.

fessor Phillips Bradley (government); Professor Henry David (history); Dr. Grayson L. Kirk (political science); Dr. Frank H. Hankins (sociology); Dr. Alvin C. Eurich (education); A. A. Ghirardi (radio-electronics); Clyde Brion Davis and Rosemary Benét (literature)



We will be glad to send more complete information about the books mentioned above, and other forthcoming publications, to anyone who sends in the coupon below.

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- ☐ _____

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Fantastic Comedy

The Innocent Voyage, by Paul Osborn, based on the novel by Richard Hughes. Belasco Theatre, November 15, 1943.

THE NEW PAUL OSBORN PLAY that the Theatre Guild is presenting is one of those plays where your enjoyment is greatly cut down if you start at it wrong. You would be wrong to take it as a stage conveyance of the remarkable novel that Richard Hughes wrote some years ago. I mean the atmosphere and special quality of that novel, which was marked by great originality of mood and tone, the rococo, the grotesque, the witty, the romantic, with pathological impressions and something of horror.

How much Mr. Osborn in writing this play from the novel was trying for these qualities I do not know. His achievement with the elusive qualities of "On Borrowed Time," another play turning on the child-theme, some seasons ago was considerable enough and highly encouraging. At any rate this stage version has by no means the unity of tone and the imagination of the book. But, using the book as a source or springboard, it does succeed in what seems to be a light and very entertaining piece of theatre, whose unity as a work of art is disturbed by intense passages which have not been prepared for, either in tone or in stage intention, and which we have to see with our fingers crossed so far as the tragic goes. This does not mean, however, that I would have these passages deleted or tamed down; I do not care enough about the play as a work of art to wish that. In themselves they are enjoyable and often admirable. This is partly due to the novel's impact and to Mr. Osborn's directing, and partly to the acting of Mr. Oscar Homolka and little Miss Abby Bonime.

But to return to my first point, I am trying to say that if you consider over-constantly the play in reference to the novel, you may of course enjoy your fine distinctions or even aisle-seat culture, but you merely throw away the pleasure you may have in a delightful occasion.

The story of "The Innocent Voyage" has been already told after a fashion in the novel; no further conveyance of it is possible within a limited space, not even the murder of the Swedish captain after the children's embarkation, plus pirates, a legal suit, et cetera.

The settings for "The Innocent Voyage" have been devised by Mr. Stewart Chaney with his to-be-expected intelligence and style; they assume, and convince us of, the unpredicted realism, or factuality, of the play's situation, and at the same time remember the haunted and strange. Miss Aline Bernstein's costumes come with the greatest happiness out of Tenniel's "Alice in Wonderland." She is one of the few people in our theatre who know the fundamentals, historical and anatomical, of costume design.

Of the company, it is necessary to say that the divers children in the play, which in a way revolves about them, have the importance of poodles enacting their various roles —even our enemies the Japanese knew this in the fourteenth century when Seami wrote that dogs and children should not be allowed on the stage because their appeal is false and outside of art. One child actor, however, is excepted, Abby Bonime. She is a sound pupil of the King-Coit School; the training that has been given her is spiritually and technically out of class with anything Theatre Guild members ever either practised or understood or could explain when it came their way. With her is Mr. Oscar Homolka, the Viennese actor, who as the pirate ship's captain gives a very fine and witty performance and who provides a rare, wise response and management for this remarkable player of eleven years.

STARK YOUNG

Pulling All Wires

ALEXANDER CALDER is having a retrospective show of his sculpture at the Museum of Modern Art, including work from the age of nine (a crayon drawing, a self-portrait dominated by a pair of pliers) to his present age, forty-five. He can make any space, no matter how crowded, whether inside or outdoors, in whatever weather, come to life with his metal sculptures, which he sometimes floats in the air on wires, where they move in the air currents, or stands on the floor like any other sculpture, or has driven by small electric motors, hidden in the woodwork. It is fantastically bright sculpture, sensitive, yet extremely energetic, humorously alive and spontaneous. The forms, abstract or nearly so, look like the exotically machined relatives of natural forms and have names like "Thirteen Spines," "Whale," "Black Beast" and "Lobster Trap and Fish Tail." Their effect is like that of meeting a dinosaur in the backyard and finding that he is not only tame but a charming companion.

For the main fact of Calder's sculpture has always been its felicity of surprise, its ability to seem highly amusing and to fit the surrounding environment. That is the quality of the eight-foot steel "mobile" that ranges the backyard of the Museum with such serene conviction. It retains all the humors, grace and wonder of the combined giant-tree, giant-animal forms by abstracting those forms down to a steel-legged tripod which supports two free-swinging steel rods with a red comma for its upper end and a white circular disc for the tail end. A counterweight attached somewhere keeps the form swaying pleasantly in the wind, and probably forever. The humor that is inherent here has always been the most prominent emotion of Calder's work, from the first wired circus performers to his latest wall decorations that he calls "Constellations." Its determinants have been the quick, light-as-air movement the line of his work takes, the fantasy nature of its subject matter, the intrinsic community of his forms with the out of doors, his primitive-sophisticated color and the casual effect of his craftsmanship, which allows you to watch all the mechanics that have put the sculptures together and make them move. It is the easy, grateful response and abandon of the parts of these sculptures to the play of outside forces, and yet their retention of great poise, that creates their particular kind exhilaration and humor.

Calder plays other notes besides humorous ones. "Black Dots," which hangs chandelier-fashion from the ceiling but is unchandelierlike in its delicacy, is a symphony of springing wires and shell forms, and achieves a light, exquisite poignancy. So does the poetic spray of small, brightly colored leaf forms called "Small Leaves," and a little tree whose grace is similar in effect to the famous one Van Gogh did. Color is accounted for by a few highly contrasting, unmodulated examples of black, white and crimson, which

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makes everything more whimsical, enriches the forms, which tend to be one-sidedly linear, one-texturedly iron, and nude as a result. There is a Wizard of Oz quality about his motor-driven sculpture, and in some of the wind-blown ones, in which ping-pong balls vie with one another, and drumsticks shaped like exclamation marks jiggle tantalizingly before a large red surface. But these same forms also achieve a tense and dramatic kind of esthetic emotion by the relationship of the movements of the various objects. The vivacity and the spectacular nature of Calder's jewelry, which the Jezebels in D. W. Griffith's movies wore—or should have—make the kind in jewelry stores look like the decorations for a mausoleum.

It is the oddity of his sculpture that it is predominantly a linear one, and its effects achieved mainly by linear rhythms of dots, planes, lines and geometric shapes, and the spaces between, which decorate space and surround it. It is a massless art. Even the actual two-dimensional surfaces he uses are in effect hollow because of the negative nature of their surfaces compared to the dramatic and dominating nature of their contours. The materials he employs, with the exception of wires, are generally used as the accent to denote the end or a beginning of a line, or a point in one of its linear rhythms. The totality of the various contours are principally shaping empty space into a form which is the essential nature of the sculpture; that is, you do not see the shapes as shapes but as the contours of open forms. Because of its almost complete dependence on line (or its synonym, movement), Calder's sculptures have always had a bareness, a lack of richness and dimension. Much of his development has been a steady effort to give them a wider complexity, a true weight—no matter how light—a greater variety and texture. There have been too many skeletons in his closet, too much air and too little form.

He is essentially a wire-sculptor, and his preoccupation with movement in sculpture, which he has explored more profoundly than anyone else, is the natural product of exploring wire, that is, line, whose most dramatic element is movement. What I think is often overlooked is the exquisite grace, plasticity and exactness of Calder's line: the neat, uncomplicated way it enfolds form or carries your eye through space. It is the lightness and fine procedure of predominantly linear arrangements that allow him to bring the hugest, most expansive, metal affairs into a room and to produce an immediate impression of spectacular rightness with the surrounding environment. I think that a Calder sculpture will raise the morale of any room about a hundred percent.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

BULGARIA ASSURED BY SOVIET ON RAIDS
Moscow Said to Pledge Sofia Will Not Be
Bombed While Russian Envoy
Is There
—*Head and subhead in The New York Times.*

The specific accusations are somewhat vague. It was pointed out to me, however, that I had called Franco a fascist and that I had declared that communism in recent years has been a minor menace compared to Nazism. They indicated that they did not want the name of the university associated with the promulgation of these views. —*From a statement by Dr. Francis E. McMahon on his "resignation" from Notre Dame University as reported in The New York Times.*

Prime Minister Churchill's statement in London yesterday (Tuesday) that he expects heavy fighting in Europe next year caused a moderate rally in the New York stock market. —*From The San Francisco Chronicle.*

One Touch of Nature

"The Lonergan case should do Canadians a lot of good down here," one New Yorker said to me. "We always regard Canadians as always having a very much holier-than-thou attitude toward Americans. We always think of you as being a pretty pious bunch, that we are the only bad behavers on this continent. This Lonergan case sort of makes us feel that we are closer kin." —*From Ronald A. McEachern's column in The Financial Post, Toronto, Canada.*

Brave New World

In secrecy comparable to that at military headquarters, briefcase brigades of American salesmen are being formed to go after business as the armies liberate occupied Europe. —*UP dispatch from London.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. —THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Farmers and Workers

SIR: If you desire to be fair why don't you advocate that wages be rolled back to the relationship with farm prices existing in the last war and that the government pay the difference in a subsidy?

In the last war the peak for the farm-price index was 201 and for the factory-wage index, 164. In February of this year, the last month for which figures are available, the farm-price index was 180 and the factory-wage index was 362. The farm-price index, as you can see, was less, but the factory-wage index was double.

Under such a situation is there any excuse for refusing to pay expenses as we go along rather than saddling on the boys when they come home part of the bills we enact while they are over there in the mire of the foxholes.

RICHARD S. WILCOX, Secretary,
St. Paul, Minn. Small Investors of America, Inc.

Stendhal and the Modern Library

SIR: Your issue of November 8 contains an open letter addressed to the Modern Library and signed by George Mayberry, which questions our announced intention of dropping Stendhal's "The Charterhouse of Parma" from the Modern Library. May I explain why this step was taken?

The total sale of this volume in our series in 1938 was 307 copies; in 1939, 636 copies; in 1940, 544 copies; in 1941, 820 copies. Last year, when the sale of every title in the series was booming, "The Charterhouse of Parma" crept up to 1,083. Of all the 234 titles in the Modern Library, this sales record is one of the worst three. Under present conditions, when every sheet of paper counts, it seemed to us that we had no choice in the

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matter but to drop such a laggard from the series. It is necessary to print a book of this length in the Modern Library in an edition of 5,000 copies; such a printing would have lasted us in this case, under the most favorable conditions, for somewhere between four and five years.

May I explain further that we have frequently been compelled to drop titles from the Modern Library that we should have liked to have kept there but that were obviously standing in the way of the healthy growth of the entire series. We have had examples before of fine reprint series that were damaged beyond repair by the retention of obvious deadwood. Some booksellers have neither the inclination nor the time to check stock carefully on each series; they see on their shelves an ample stock of the titles that do not sell rapidly and quite overlook the fact that they are sold out on the really popular numbers. Gradually the impression grows upon them that the series is losing its popularity and, one fine day, they remove the books from a favorable and accessible position in the front of the store to some dusty shelf in the rear. The fact that this has never happened to the Modern Library, we attribute to our admittedly ruthless policy of eliminating all titles that cannot hold their own after a full trial period in actual sales.

Incidentally, we'd like to point out to Mr. Mayberry that Stendhal's "The Red and the Black" is still obtainable in the Modern Library. Some day I hope that public demand will warrant the relisting of "The Charterhouse of Parma."

New York City BENNETT A. CERF

[I think Mr. Cerf's explanation was anticipated in my original letter. His "ruthless" commercial candor is a refreshing contrast to the pious highmindedness of most of those engaged in the business of making and selling books, but I still feel that Mr. Cerf could keep "such a laggard" as "The Charterhouse of Parma" on his list without seriously prejudicing the popularity or the financial prospects of the Modern Library. – G. M.]

Kate Mitchell and the Orient

SIR: As an Oriental who is an American citizen and is interested in promoting better understanding between the East and the West, I feel amazed at the attitude of certain American friends of China and India who have denounced two most important books on future relations between the East and the West "The Warning to the West," by Dr. K. Sridharani [February 22], and "Between Tears and Laughter" [October 4], by Dr. Lin Yutang. Both these books have been unjustly criticized by Miss Kate L. Mitchell in her reviews in The New Republic, because she could not agree with the views of the authors. These books have presented unpalatable facts—not fables—regarding the trend of thinking prevalent among the Anglo-American people in general and statesmen in particular, on the question of freedom of Asiatic peoples and the treatment accorded to China and India by their Anglo-American allies.

It is my . . . judgment that both Dr. Shridharani and Dr. Lin have rendered a distinct service to the American people by telling them exactly what the majority of the thinking public of India and China feel about the trend of Anglo-American power politics and anti-Asianism. . . .

Miss Mitchell speaks loudly about the power of the masses in the West. But the fact remains that the masses in the Anglo-American world, even in Soviet Russia, have mighty little to do with formulating foreign policy. It may not be out of place to point out that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was opposed by the representatives of the American working class —American labor unions—and others. . . .

Miss Mitchell and other [critics] may be enamored of the ideal of Western civilization, as it is being practised. But Dr. Lin and other [Orientals] may rightly regard it as *a form of civilized barbarism* which needs to be humanized. Dr. Lin may be pardoned for his suggestion that the teachings of Oriental philosophers and teachers—Jesus was one of them—might help in accomplishing this end. Miss Mitchell, a Marxist, must have felt hurt that Dr. Lin dared to attack materialism as a curse of the present-day world. . . .

TARAKNATH DAS

College of the City of New York

Subhas Chandra Bose

SIR: I was interested in the reference to Subhas Chandra Bose in the article "Japan's Puppet Empire," by Heinz H. F. Eulau, which appeared in The New Republic of November 15.

Mr. Eulau said that Subhas Chandra Bose, "a sincere Indian patriot," enjoys great prestige among millions of his countrymen. I seriously doubt the correctness of that statement because Bose has been a Japanese puppet (prostitute would be a better word) for the past fifteen or twenty years. He first came into prominence during the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in 1927 when he posed at that time as an Indian Communist leader.

I have talked to many Indian Nationalists and have never found one who ever had any respect whatever for Bose, who was regarded as a Japanese hireling. He used to issue a little paper in English which was mailed out from Japan to newspapers and individuals in the Far East, but I don't think anyone was ever able to make head or tail of it. I doubt whether anyone will be seriously concerned by any puppet Indian government that he might head.

JOHN B. POWELL

New York City

Poets, Traitors and Patriots

SIR: Aside from the fact that people seem to be using Pound as an aiming-point to take shots at Yeats, Malcolm Cowley's discussion of the case, in The New Republic for November 15, raises a question rather more interesting, to my mind, than Ezra's ultimate fate. If we accept the premise that Pound, being a traitor and a good poet, should be pardoned the vice of being the former by the virtue of being the latter, what conclusion should we reach concerning those who are bad poets and aggressive patriots? Should they be shot, or hanged? I have in mind certain individuals, nameless for the moment, who ought to be doing quite a little worrying until this matter is settled.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

Jackson Heights, N. Y.

[There's an English army song with the title, "Bless Them All." – M. C.]

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Victor S. Yarros, of La Jolla, California, writes in to say that he believes the League of Nations is being unjustly ignored as the best available instrument for international coöperation and security.

The World Jewish Congress announces it has been informed by the Swedish Legation that a bill outlawing the spreading of false rumors and the making of fraudulent statements that can cause hatred or contempt against any group in the nation because of origin or creed, has been prepared by the Swedish Department of Justice. The bill provides that the offender can be punished by fines or imprisonment. In citing the reason for proposing the bill, the department declared that anti-Semitic propaganda can, if it increases, cause serious diversities, and that such propaganda is now difficult to punish.

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Books in Review

E. M. Forster's Answer

AT THE END of "A Passage to India," Dr. Abdul Aziz, the impulsive Mohammedan, is taking his last horseback ride with the only European who had supported him during his trial. "Yes, we shall drive every blasted Englishman into the sea," Aziz exclaims, half-kissing his companion, "and then you and I shall be friends." Fielding asks him, "Why can't we be friends now? It's what I want. It's what you want." The author himself comes forward to answer Fielding's question: "But the horses didn't want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn't want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temple, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion . . . they didn't want it, they said in their hundred voices, 'No, not yet,' and the sky said, 'No, not there.' "

Almost everybody who has written about India since 1924 has echoed Fielding's question and, in one fashion or another, most people have given Forster's answer. But Louis Bromfield is one exception. In "The Rains Came," a novel published in 1937, he displayed his American optimism and his faith in the healing power of a great natural calamity. What he said in effect was that Fielding and Aziz—with all others like them—could be friends if they suffered together. If new plagues could be added to those which India now endures—if there were devastating floods, a famine, cholera and a fire that swept the earth clean—then all the old difficulties would be forgotten. The wicked would perish and the good men of every race—American missionaries, English remittance men, Hindu doctors, Sikh and Mohammedan soldiers, Brahmans, Untouchables and reigning Maharanis—would all work together to create a spotless India. Bromfield's book, besides being filmed, was enthusiastically received in England, where millions of people must have been hoping subconsciously for a catastrophe to solve the Indian problem. But the rains came year after year without being heavy enough to efface the mistakes of the past.

Christine Weston's new novel, "Indigo,"[1] sets out to deal with an India in which Fielding's question seemed to be less urgent. She is describing the French indigo planters who have lived in the United Provinces for generations and regard the English as late intruders in a country where the French are at home. Not being an army of occupation, they feel less need to assert their superiority over the dark-skinned races. It was quite natural for Jacques de St. Remy to regard an Indian boy as his best friend. It was also natural for Mme. de St. Remy, the matriarch, to encourage her son's friendship for Hardyal, while trying to separate him from old Mrs. Lyttleton, who had been his father's mistress, and from Bertie Wood, the English girl he wanted to marry.

The first part of the book is dominated by these family relationships and especially by the mother's efforts to keep her son French, Catholic and an indigo planter. Slowly, however, we become less interested in the matriarch, more interested in Hardyal and his relations with the European world. The spirit of E. M. Forster begins to brood over the story. Some of his episodes are repeated in a different form, and we recognize half a dozen of his characters, reappearing as if by metempsychosis. Thus, Forster's wise old Mrs. Moore (*Esmiss Esmoor*, the natives called her) becomes the even older and wiser Mrs. Lyttleton. Her son Ronny Heaslop becomes John Macbeth, without losing any of his officiousness or conventionality. Adela Quested gains youth and beauty before being reincarnated as Bertie Wood, but she has almost the same experience in the Terai Jungle that Adela had in the Marabar Hills. Some of Forster's characters are reborn into two different bodies. That is the fate of Dr. Abdul Aziz, whose vanity and foolishness are assigned to Hanif, the Mohammedan servant, while his warmth and beauty are given to Hardyal. Cyril Fielding also takes two new forms, those of Aubrey Wall and of Jacques himself. In the first form, he turns against India; in the second form, he asks his familiar question: "But if Hardyal should no longer want us. . . ."

It is dangerous for any younger novelist to challenge comparison with Forster. You can't help noticing, in Miss Weston's case, that she lacks his distinction of style (though she writes good unobtrusive prose) and that her characters are much less sharply drawn than his, even when they are essentially the same people. She has none of Forster's irony and very little of the humor he displays, for example, in reporting the conversation of English ladies at the Chandrapore club. "Why, the kindest thing one can do to a native is to let him die," says Mrs. Callendar. "How if he went to heaven?" asks Mrs. Moore with a gentle but crooked smile. "He can go where he likes as long as he doesn't come near me. They give me the creeps."—"As a matter of fact I have thought what you were saying about heaven and that's why I am against Missionaries," says the lady who had been a nurse. "I am all for Chaplains, but all against Missionaries." Miss Weston would never write such a dialogue. Having spent her first twenty years in India, she doesn't regard either the English officials or the Indians themselves as human grotesques to be pictured in all their absurdity. To her they are simply people, and she sets them down as she remembers them.

That is her one advantage over Forster, and one of her many advantages over the other novelists who have dealt with Indian life since Kipling's time. She isn't writing an exotic story that tries to weave the spell of the East out of cobwebs and cobras. When she mentions peepul trees or champak or cardamon seeds, you don't feel that she referred to her travel diary for the picturesque detail; she is merely recording what she remembers from her everyday life. For this reason her book gives a feeling of density that you miss in other Indian novels, where the landscape seems to be painted on a backdrop. For this reason, too, there is the weight of experience in her answer to Fielding's ques-

[1] Indigo, by Christine Weston. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 374 pages. $2.50.

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tion. It is almost the same answer that Forster gave, but with one historical qualification. She says in effect that friendship between Europeans and Indians was possible before the First World War, but that the English have grown continually more uneasy and aloof, the Indians more rebellious. Today not even Hardyal and Jacques, the boyhood companions, can feel at home together. The land in its hundred voices says, "No, not yet," and the sky says, "No, not there."

MALCOLM COWLEY

This Powerful Man

Men and Coal, by McAlister Coleman. Foreword by John Chamberlain. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 350 pages. $3.

WHEN THERE IS URGENT NEED for a warm human book about the coal miners, their problems and their families, it is regrettable that "Men and Coal" does not fill it. Instead Mac Coleman has written a history of the United Mine Workers of America—one-fourth pre-Lewis, three-fourths Lewis—a disappointing book. Mac, who for so long and so consistently pointed up John L. Lewis' shortcomings, appears in the strange role of apologist for, as Mac calls him, "this powerful man." For me it was Mac in his novel "Red Neck" (1936, co-authored with Steve Raushenbush) who so accurately portrayed Lewis that, in five years of association with him, I never lost a sense of skepticism about his motives and purposes. "Red Neck," in telling about a visit of the mine-union president to the White House in Hoover's term relates:

> The President turned to Kennerley [the mine-union head]. "How did it happen that you never became a coal operator?" he asked.
>
> The Big Boy was not to be caught without an answer. "Because I never had the money," he said.

In his current book Mac calls Lewis "one of the most contradictory, contentious and altogether compelling figures in the history of American labor." To be sure, Mac includes a few criticisms of John L. Lewis, and in so doing reveals how well he knows and understands him, because each criticism is done in just that careful way that does not offend Lewis but ingratiates oneself with him. Mac must know Lewis' sinister motives and dark purposes, but just why he forgets them and chooses to play the role of apologist is not revealed in "Men and Coal." The book is dedicated to Oscar Ameringer, "Stalwart Fighter for 'The Men from the Picks'," the great Socialist, humorist and journalist who died a few weeks after "Men and Coal" was published. Oscar knew Lewis, dubbed him "the king of racketeers," and never changed his mind about him.

Some useful history, however, is included in this book, which is much better written than researched. The one part of the coal country that Mac really knows is southern Illinois, America's "Egypt," and he writes feelingly about it. His brief journalistic account of the pre-Lewis history of the United Mine Workers of America gives a not too unreliable picture of the miners' fight for freedom from 1861 to 1919. Mac covered the Herrin, Illinois, killings in 1922 for the Eastern papers and his "Blood at Herrin" chapter is the best account of this sad episode in labor's

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history that I have seen. The story of mine accidents, "Life and Death in a Coal Camp," is good, but the chapter on "The Future of Coal" is merely an uncritical collection of notes from what other people have said. But that is all. The rest of the book is Lewis' side of the story in the fight against the many internal union opponents of Lewis in the twenties and early thirties, the NRA, the CIO's founding, the FDR-Lewis feud, the Willkie speech, the captive-mine strike of 1941, the AFL-baiting and later remarriage, the War Labor Board controversy and Lewis' wartime strikes in 1943.

Mac misnames his history of the mine workers' union "Men and Coal," because he mistakenly contends in his introduction that "with the miners, whether or not they belonged to the UMW, the influence of that organization upon the life and fortune of every mine worker has been so preponderant as to make its story the bulk of any adequate chronicle of American coal mining." There is an element of truth in this conclusion, but Mac embraces it so fully that he doesn't tell much about the men of coal or their human problems because of his deep engrossment with the UMW; and, equally unfortunately, he doesn't tell much about the miners' union for his deep engrossment in the power and glory of Lewis.

John Chamberlain has written a foreword to this book, which is about the miners' 1943 wage dispute and not about "Men and Coal." In it, though, he makes a sweeping observation against which I must testify. Chamberlain says "the fact is that every single characteristic of Lewis is also a characteristic of the average coal-town community." I lived in a coal patch for seven years (1924-31) and worked with Lewis for five years (1935-40), and the only characteristics of Nemacolin, Pennsylvania, a coal patch of five hundred families, that I saw in Lewis were its few bad ones. I feel confident that if Chamberlain would go with me through the coal patches of western Pennsylvania, he would come away with more respect for these coal-towns and their people than for J. L. Lewis.

HAROLD J. RUTTENBERG

The Scourge of Unemployment

The Unemployed, by Eli Ginzberg and Associates. New York: Harper and Brothers. 418 pages. $4.

WE HAVE CONQUERED UNEMPLOYMENT by creating weapons of war. That is the great irony of our industrial civilization. While men are fighting for that civilization we are preparing presumably to give them jobs in peacetime. It has been suggested that an incentive tax scheme be adopted to induce a high level of consumption, that we eliminate monopolistic restrictions on production and launch a government-subsidized investment program. These ideas are undoubtedly worthwhile and undoubtedly will be torn apart in legislative chambers when the time comes to make them real. But then, there's always the WPA and Home Relief.

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minder of things that were and a depressing portent of things to come. Dr. Ginzberg and his associates (statisticians, psychiatrists and social workers) interviewed in 1940 some two hundred families that were caught in the bitter maelstrom of unemployment. Over a hundred were still struggling pitifully to extricate themselves; they were either Home Relief "clients" or on the WPA. Dr. Ginzberg analyzed their reactions and attitudes toward such varied matters as trade unions, marriage, politics, religion and relief with the meticulous care and scientific detachment of the anthropologist. He shows, by a recital of case histories and by statistical description, their background, their educational attainments and home life, and their amazing domestic management with the niggardly allowance granted by the welfare authorities. He shows, moreover, how the increasing annoyance of home trivia, the weakening of parental control and the overpowering sense of frustration contributed to the destructive emotional shock brought on by a depressed economic status.

This volume is not so broad in scope, perhaps, as Prof. E. W. Baake's "The Unemployed Worker," yet it is more incisive. The study was limited to the economically dependent of New York City, and for analytic reasons included only Irish-Catholic, Jewish and Anglo-Saxon Protestant families. The story it tells, however, is not atypical; the effects of unemployment are quite the same in Oklahoma, Boston and New York.

After waiting too long for prosperity to peek out from behind its corner, the government resorted to the age-old expedient of made-work and direct monetary relief. Ginzberg does not evaluate the economic aspects of the WPA and Home Relief. He is concerned primarily with psychological impacts. The WPA, he points out, unquestionably was the better part of depression policy; at least it helped to preserve some skills. All that can be said for Home Relief is that "it kept people alive." Relief policies in the thirties suffered from a curmudgeonly desire to reduce the cost per case. A more liberal approach should have been adopted, it is argued, to help clients return to private employment. "In the last analysis," says Ginzberg, "the wealth of a nation is the quality of its human resources. Only if every individual has the right to work can the United States be true to its heritage and fulfill its promise."

The methods used by public agencies only forced a sharp wedge between the employed and the unemployed. Close personal supervision did not always uncover the malingerers. It did, however, discourage the search for outside private work. People on relief and on the WPA were not inherently lazy; that notion is shown to be nothing more than a cruel and brutal canard. The unemployed were not less efficient than the rest of the working population. Yet private employers discriminated against anyone who came from the public-assistance rosters. And the lack of cooperation between public employment offices and welfare agencies did not ease the situation. It took a war to put people back to work.

Dr. Ginzberg has told us, in no uncertain terms, what we failed to do for the unemployed. His book is an eloquent plea to recast our thinking. We may not be able to eradicate completely the scourge of unemployment, but we can try to mitigate its ravages.

BEN B. SELIGMAN

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Poetry and Doctrine

Clowns and Angels, by Wallace Fowlie. New York: Sheed and Ward. 160 pages. $2.50.
Flower of Evil, by Edwin Morgan. New York: Sheed and Ward. 256 pages. $3.

AT FIRST SIGHT, the ascendency of Baudelaire and Rimbaud in the Catholic Revival movement appears almost as incongruous as if the Communists were to adopt Saint Francis and set "The Little Flower" beside "Das Kapital."

Baudelaire, whose "Fleurs du Mal" was suppressed as immoral and blasphemous, and Rimbaud, the *enfant terrible* who renounced literature before his nineteenth birthday, and took to gun-running in Abyssinia, passed from the literary scene in 1867 and 1873, respectively, leaving no odor of sanctity behind them. Their first following was among a little group of decadent esthetes. By 1914 they had been taken up by political radicals so wholeheartedly that their works were considered Bibles of sedition.

Yet their growing prestige among Catholics is not due to any misapprehension. On the whole, Catholic evaluation of the *poètes maudits*, of which Edwin Morgan's very readable biography of Baudelaire is a worthy example, has been just and penetrating. It recognizes them for what they are: great poets and visionaries with a rare sense of the irreductibility and supernaturalness of reality.

If there is basis for the Rev. L. S. Bondy's protest that Baudelaire's life, "his pornographic reputation, his categorical denial of Christian faith" make him a strange father of a Catholic movement, there is sound vision in Wallace Fowlie's assertion that the imprint of the Christian spirit is "as visible in 'Les Fleurs du Mal' as in Saint Augustine's 'Confessions'." Saints have led less exemplary lives than Baudelaire's, and his reputation was not of his own making. Whatever use he put them to, Baudelaire's idiom and modes of thought were Catholic; and his aspiration to sainthood, however floundering, was genuine. Mr. Morgan's speculation as to the piety of Baudelaire's deathbed sentiments—and particularly the publishers' quite unwarranted statement that the author of "Les Fleurs du Mal" died "weeping and clasping a crucifix"—are not essential to justify or explain Catholic acceptance of his leadership.

However finical the Catholic mind may be on points of doctrine, it is apt to approach the arts with an inclusive gusto that is lacking in Protestantism. Accustomed in its ecclesiastical art to Grünewald, Rubens and the lurid realism of the Spaniards, it finds no barrier in the "bad taste" of the *poètes maudits*. Moreover, Baudelaire and Rimbaud are mystics, and mystics have traditionally been judged leniently in doctrinal matters. Some of the greatest mystics, like Eckhart, were of such dubious orthodoxy that they seem more Brahmanic than Christian.

This being so, if Baudelaire, who urges the proletariat to "climb to heaven and hurl God down to earth," and Rimbaud, who rails at "the putrid kiss of Jesus," are to be accepted as inspired mystics, what does need explaining is the squeamishness of most Catholic critics regarding Proust, the foremost mystic among novelists. Mr. Fowlie's essay on Proust discusses only the introductory episodes of "A la

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Récherche du Temps Perdu." The main body of the novel, its structure, purpose and import, he dismisses with the phrase, "Proust is no metaphysician."

Now reactionary critics, Vichy men for the most, hate Proust for his social views. But Mr. Fowlie is no reactionary. His faith is that of militant liberals like the late Cardinal Verdier. Yet, admiring Proust as an artist, he chooses to ignore the essence of his work.

Perhaps the explanation of this reticence common to most critics who write from a Catholic standpoint is that Proust points a way to salvation outside of the Church. His novel is a "demonstration," as he himself calls it, that no soul ever becomes too disintegrated and degraded to be reborn through grace and enter into the "ineffable joy" of oneness with ultimate reality. Proust avoids the vocabulary of the orthodox metaphysician, and organized religion plays no part in his system. But, vocabulary apart, his conclusions as to the aim of man's existence and his means of attaining it resemble strikingly those of Saint John of the Cross, that other mystic who has also been accused of being more of an artist than a metaphysician.

As religious figures, Baudelaire and Rimbaud are acceptable to Catholicism because they fail. Their ways end up in darkness and despair as Proust's in triumphant dawn. Baudelaire will win few souls to his belief in immortality as a dread inevitability. Rimbaud's confession of the futility, if not the guilt, of his sins warns followers away. But Proust's ecstatic "Felix culpa!" is too close to Saint Augustine's for comfort.

RAMON GUTHRIE

History of a Quarrel

A History of Poland, by C. Halecki. New York: Roy Publishers. 336 pages. $3.50.

THE RECENT FLARE-UP between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet government startled the Allied world. Actually, there was nothing surprising about this, for Poles and Russians have never before been allies; on the contrary, they have fought and wrangled for centuries. Polish troops seized Moscow in 1610; Russian armies occupied Warsaw in 1764 and 1794; in 1920 Polish regiments held Kiev for a brief time and Russian troops almost reached Warsaw a few months later.

Probably no country is so impounded by its history as Poland. Almost the first incident recorded by Professor Halecki in his admirable history is the attack on the first Christian prince of Poland, Mieszko (962-992), by a German count in the year 963, one year after the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. Poles and Germans fought for centuries before a stable frontier was established. In the eighteenth century the struggle was resumed by the Hohenzollerns, who were able to seize a large part of Poland; after 1919 the issue burst out afresh, and in 1939 Adolf Hitler again seized the sword. In the thirteenth century began the struggle between Germans and Poles for the Baltic coast. In the fifteenth century a compromise was reached by which Poland got West Prussia while East Prussia remained German. Frederick the Great seized West Prussia in 1772; Germany lost it in 1919; Hitler reseized it in 1939. Throughout the centuries of conflict Germany has generally been the stronger power.

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Under Boleslas I (992-1025), "we catch sight," says Professor Halecki, "of the outline of a great design which stretched beyond the ethnical limits of Poland." This continuous effort to extend Poland eastward—induced in part by the pressure of Germany on the west—led first to union with Lithuania and then to repeated wars with Russia. These wars were wars of prestige and dynastic ambition, not wars of nationality, and the fact that the peasant population of the eastern provinces of Poland consisted of Lithuanians, White Russians and Ukrainians (the nobles were Polonized) was not an issue. In the nineteenth century, however, this factor of nationality became of decisive importance in the relations of Poland and Russia. By the settlement of 1815 pre-partition Poland was not restored; instead Russia set up the so-called "Congress Kingdom," which was limited to ethnical Poland. The refusal of the Tsar to include the non-Polish provinces which had belonged to Poland before the Partitions was largely responsible for the rising of 1830. The same problem arose in 1919. The Poles believed that they were entitled to have restored to them the frontier of 1772, but they recognized that on the basis of nationality this was out of the question and they proposed a compromise line which the Russians readily accepted (Treaty of Riga, March, 1921). This line went beyond the ethnographical line recommended to the Poles by their Western allies (the Curzon line) and took in regions where the Polish landowners were dominant, but where the peasants were not Polish. Thus the Polish claim to the frontier of 1921 has more basis than many people ignorant of the long history back of it are willing to admit.

Professor Halecki, formerly professor of History in the University of Warsaw and now director of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, treats this complicated and controversial history in a scientific manner and with restraint. The greater part of the book, covering the time to 1914, was written for the International Congress of Historical Studies which met in Warsaw in 1933; only the last section on the years since 1919 is a result of the war. Mr. Halecki does not pretend that Poland has to be defended at all costs. He freely admits the weaknesses of Poland before the Partitions, notably the factionalism and the utter selfishness of the *schlachta* (landed classes), and he recognizes that the restored Poland of 1919 failed to solve many of her problems, especially the questions of the minorities and agrarian reform. In general, he writes clearly, interestingly, objectively. His book is not the work of a jingo, but of a conscientious man who is deeply convinced that the moral law provides a firmer foundation for a state than political expediency.

Professor Halecki has written the history of his country and does not attempt to guess the future. Nevertheless his dispassionate account reveals a state of mind which is bound to affect the future of Poland most seriously. He is at some pains to show that Poland should not be judged solely by her inability to prevent partition at the end of the eighteenth century or her failure to create within the short space of twenty years the full political, economic and military organization necessary in the twentieth century. He points proudly to the centuries when the Jagiello rulers (1386-1572) made Poland one of the principal states of Europe, and he contends that the Polish culture of those days was

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not far behind the achievement of Western countries. Without saying it in so many words, Professor Halecki apparently believes—as do many, perhaps most, Poles—that his country should be reckoned a Great Power now and in the future. Certainly Polish foreign policy prior to this war was greatly influenced by the desire to have Poland recognized as a Great Power, Colonel Beck, the last foreign minister, ostentatiously tried to play off Russia against Germany. Disaster of course resulted, for there are only about twenty-five million Poles, as against about eighty million Germans and more than a hundred and ninety million Russians.

It is greatly to be hoped that when Poland is restored after the war, her rulers will rid themselves of the illusion that Poland, with her relatively small population and limited resources, can play a role comparable to that of Britain, Russia or the United States. They should hearken to the statement ascribed to General Tojo that a great power must have at least a hundred million inhabitants. If the Poles will content themselves with creating a democratic and progressive state, they will have an honorable and secure place in Europe, for they are in many ways a peculiarly attractive people and the world wishes them well.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT


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A Reader's List

JAN SMUTS: A BIOGRAPHY, by F. S. Crafford (Doubleday, Doran, $3.50). Although pro-Smuts, Crafford, a South African, has written a remarkably objective biography of the "soldier, statesman, scientist and philosopher" who saved South Africa for the United Nations. American readers will be shocked at the dark blots on the revered elder statesman's domestic record; more than once he has broken strikes and native disturbances with gunfire. Smuts is a dual personality; on one hand, world statesman, League of Nations architect, current prophet (rather circumspect) of a better world—on the other, a hard, opportunistic politician. This book is a thorough record of Smuts's career and South Africa's political history (the two are largely synonymous). The native problem is scantily treated.

YOURS FOR TOMORROW: A PERSONAL TESTAMENT FOR FREEDOM, by Helen Hill Miller (Farrar and Rinehart, $2). In this book, Mrs. Miller, the executive director of the National Policy Committee, seeks to effect in her two sons a deeper understanding of the traditions of American freedom and democracy. She traces for them a heritage of ardent family effort over the centuries in this direction. She evokes the spirit of the past to encourage a further march into the future. To this she adds her own alert and well informed knowledge of contemporary politics. The resulting legacy is in the best vein of American liberalism.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, by Ernest W. Williams Jr. (National Planning Association, 25 cents). Mr. Williams discusses present difficulties and future possibilities of the railroad industry. Competition from other forms of transport has and will continue increasingly to limit its usefulness. The railroads require technological improvement, the elimination of lines that are functionally obsolescent and greater coördination with rival systems of transport. In the postwar era, the most promising line of development for the industry will be as a carrier of bulk commodities in large quantities over relatively long distances. In this way the industry can retain its most profitable activity and be a better public service. To this end, proper planning is necessary now.

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TOP HATS AND TOM-TOMS: DAYS AND NIGHTS IN LIBERIA, by Elizabeth Dearmin Furbay (Ziff-Davis, $3). Mrs. Furbay spent three years in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, with her husband who was head of the College of West Africa. Much of her account is concerned with the usual phenomena of African travel, sounds, smells, jiggers, quinine, etc. These, though interesting, are by now nothing unusual. More novel is her account of the unique history and present condition of the Liberian Republic, in every aspect of its national existence an odd blend of the primitive and civilized. The coexistence of modern science and juju witchcraft, top-hatted government officials and loin-clothed bush natives makes for an amusing narrative that, on occasion, rises to points of sociological interest.

IN SEARCH OF MATURITY: AN INQUIRY INTO PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION AND SELF-EDUCATION, by Fritz Kunkel, M.D. (Scribner's, $2.75). Dr. Kunkel's main thesis—and perhaps his main error—is that if psychology were given "its rightful place as a historical or philosophical science, together with ethics, economics and the history of culture," all would be well. The most important contribution of psychology *as a science* has been its attempt to free itself of value-judgments. This Dr. Kunkel deplores. His goal is a combination of religion and psychology which will, in itself, act as a panacea for all the mental ills that flesh is heir to.

THE WAR FOR MAN'S SOUL, by Ernest Jackh (Farrar and Rinehart, $2.50). Dr. Jackh sees this war as more than a global war; it is a religious war, differing from the religious wars of the past in that while they were fought always between God and God, or between God and the gods, the religious issue in this war is between God and anti-god (Hitler). Realizing that the success of postwar plans will not depend solely on the continued collaboration of the United Nations, but that Germany will have to be reintegrated into the world community, Dr. Jackh pleads for the spiritual reëducation of all nations to follow this war. As the former president of the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, and a respected European statesman, he speaks sincerely and with authority.

IN PRAISE OF WISDOM, by Jacob Klatzkin (L. B. Fischer, $3.50). A book of philosophical paragraphs, short essays and aphorisms, heterogeneous and hazy enough to deal congenially with such divergent attitudes as the Platonic and the Marxian. The author is the sort of philosopher who seriously uses capitalized terms—The Great Unknown, for example. His style adds up to an annoying persistance, past any sane point of satiety, in the use of soaring, figurative descriptions of personality and thought-processes. There are, however, bits of intelligence pickled in this sour jar of metaphysical verbiage. But the book as a whole is more interesting psychologically than intellectually profound. One finds here the kind of expression of observations on life that demands an esthetic recreation of life, as a base, to keep from becoming airy, lost and even a little foolish. Poetry must be founded on real elements of life. And science is science.

THE LADDER OF PROGRESS IN PALESTINE: A STORY OF ARCHEOLOGICAL ADVENTURE, by Chester C. McCown (Harpers, $3.50). By selecting a single region, well adapted to his purpose of describing and explaining the varied methods, tasks and accomplishments of archeology, the author has succeeded in giving a clear and interesting delineation of the various aspects of a science which even the educated layman is apt to picture in a confused and semi-superstitious fashion. Formerly a director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem, Mr. McCown is both authoritative and experienced and discourses with equal competence on the grimy intricacies of digging holes in the ground, the history of Biblical cities and the anatomy of Neanderthal Man.

PREVIEW OF HISTORY, by Raymond Gram Swing (Doubleday, Doran, $2). This is a selection of broadcasts spoken after December, 1941; it includes eight speeches and a twenty-page postwar plan. The crucial test of those who must utter quickly is the later reading. Swing is master of the minimum statement and the economy of his inferences makes them safe if not exactly penetrating. He produces a sequence of commentary which sponges up immediate happenings without being made soggy by them. In gearing utterances to the march of time, he avoids having his mind stamped out by the excitement of mere eventfulness. Standing between the impending event and the little man, the commentator reassures the latter while boldly facing—any-

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

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way talking about—the fact of the former as released by officials. It is quite an art and Swing is a great pedagogue.

THE NEW EUROPE, by Bernard Newman (Macmillan, $3.75). Lloyd George did not know who, what or where Teschen was. Newman, who for fifteen summers toured disputed Europe on a bicycle, tells us about the hundred Teschens of the distressful continent. His information is abundant, lucid, generally fair and substantially accurate. (One may guess that he gives about 5,000 facts: if 100 were wrong, his score would still be very high.) However, the essential points will be the spirit and method of the settlement: these agreed upon, the detailed application may be turned over to experts. Newman is more satisfactory as a summer bicyclist than as a political philosopher.

THE RUNNING TIDE, by Irina Aleksander (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, $2.50). Another propaganda novel. This one is based on the life of Valentina Orlikova, third mate on a Soviet merchant ship, who recently visited this country. Its non-fictional aspects are by far the most interesting: Russia's educational system, the solution of the minority-group problem by insisting that each group maintain its identity without sacrificing its status, and finally the heroism of the Russian people portrayed in a description of the siege of Leningrad. The writing is journalistic with a human-interest slant.

LOOK YOUR LAST, by John Stephen Strange (Crime Club, $2). This four-star item of international intrigue again features Barney Gantt, the newspaper photographer, who thinks there is more than meets the eye in the disappearance of a Mr. Smith in Manhattan. He's right, too. His prying lays bare the plausible machinations of an international oil cartel (is truth stranger than fiction?). A timely subject and an absorbing story.

THE LADY IN THE LAKE, by Raymond Chandler (Knopf, $2). Philip Marlowe, peerless private investigator, is hired to discover the whereabouts of Mrs. Derace Kingsley. The search brings him up against a lot of strange and terrible people, which gives Mr. Chandler a chance to write some of his best tough dialogue. This one is easier to guess than any of the author's previous books, but it's an A-1 job.

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A. G. MEZERIK is no long-haired professor. He comes right out of the business world, where he has been consultant to companies, publications and associations. He is a frequent contributor of articles on industry to The New Republic and other periodicals.

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America and the Postwar World

A Special Section

As VICTORY approaches for the United Nations cause, the insistent question that is cropping up in men's minds everywhere is whether we shall enjoy the fruits of victory or whether once more they will elude us as they did after World War I. In the answer to this problem, what America does is central. It is not a question of whether we shall whip ourselves up into forcing our leadership on the rest of the world. Nor is it a question of whether we shall impose the pattern of our institutions and power on other nations. Neither would be desirable, and both would be most difficult. The real question is whether we shall do our share in the task of forging an enduring peace—a share that shall be commensurate with our resources, our power and our prestige.

If they are to fill this role, the American people must understand the difficulties in the path, and they must understand the danger of the alternatives. They must know what forces there were that caused the bungling of the peace after World War I. They must know what machinery for world organization lies ready at hand for them to use, and what policies still remain to be fashioned, both in the economic and political areas. They must know themselves—know what the disruptive forces are and what the elements of health and strength are in the body of their own opinion. And they must know how usable is their own governmental machinery for building peace, and in what ways it needs new emphases and revisions.

To the broadening of this understanding we dedicate the present supplement, in the belief that all the necessary material for building a decent post-war world lies at hand, and that what is mainly needed is the forging of a democratic will.

America and International Organization

THE UNITED NATIONS have acted as an international vigilance committee to deal with aggression. Without authorization by formal constitution or charter, the major part of the burden has been borne and the leadership has been assumed by those with the greatest military and industrial power—Great Britain, Russia, China and the United States. These four powers, meeting in Moscow, have now decided that this vigilance committee should be succeeded by a permanent international government to keep the peace after the war is won.

These nations have agreed to fight the war to a finish against their respective enemies (Japan is not at war with Russia). They have also agreed to promote the establishment at the earliest practicable date of "a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Is this new organization to be patterned after the League of Nations? The Declaration of Moscow does not say, but the tide of informed opinion will probably lead to certain important differences. The differences from the League should be, at the minimum, two. The first comes under the head of actual willingness to use force, if necessary, to restrain aggression; the second comes under the head of some assurance that the force will really be used by those who have overwhelming power at their command, and will be used promptly enough to prevent a disastrous world war, instead of merely to win it after hanging over the verge of defeat.

The Covenant of the League did provide for the ultimate use of force, along with provision for other "sanctions." But most of the pacifistically inclined nations which composed the League were not ready either morally or physically to take the obligation seriously. They supposed that, once the threat of force was engrossed on a piece of paper, aggressors would be frightened by the threat to such an extent that it need never be made good. They were in the weak position of a habitual bluffer in a poker game, who the first time his bluff was called (and also the second, third and fourth) had nothing in his hand. We have learned again by bitter experience that force is the ultimate arbiter. We should not make any threats without being willing and able to make them good. If we are willing and able to do this, and potential aggressors know it, only then do we stand a good chance that the threat will suffice.

Execution of the threat, moreover, must not be hedged about by so much political machinery and so many technicalities that there is strong uncertainty whether the great powers will act when the occasion arises, or whether they will act promptly. Last time the League sanctions were hamstrung on various occa-

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sions by the non-participation of the United States in the Covenant, by the reluctance of Britain or France to take the risk of war, by the eventual isolation of the Soviet Union and by the decision of the smaller powers to try to play safe by remaining neutral. If all could be sure in the future that Britain, Russia, the United States and China would act in unison to put down aggression, the cornerstone of security would be laid. No "international police force" which did not include the armies, navies and air forces of these powers would be capable of being more than a traffic policeman or a truant officer. But if it did include them, it would not need unanimous support from the other nations. For these reasons we favor the continuation of the nuclear alliance within the framework of the United Nations.

The sole hope for any militaristic or aggressive forces in the defeated nations which may survive this war, or may spring into being later, would be a rift within the Big Four. The failure of Britain and Russia to stay together, or of the Soviet Union and the United States to remain close friends, would be a victory for them. Likewise a chance of detaching China from any of the other three would give them hope. A mere spark of danger, favored by such a draft of air, might smolder and spring into flames at some future time. But if the four act as one, they will smother any fire at its inception. No Axis militarist movement would even have the chance to achieve domestic power if the Germans and the Japanese could be rendered absolutely certain that in any future war they would face the same heavy odds that will exist at the close of this one.

What assurance would these four have that none of their own number would break its promises and become an aggressor? Only the general understanding of the character and position of each. Before the war they were called even by their enemies the "satisfied" powers. They already possess great territory, stability and resources. Each requires peace for its own development, if not for its continued life. Nothing in this uncertain world is less likely than that one or more of them would deliberately attack any of the others.

But what about the other nations? What about the United Nations as a whole? Each of them is jealous of its status and rights. While none of the others has as much military power, actual and potential, as any of the big four, all will wish to be regarded as equals. We cannot create a world order without considering France or, in the second and third ranks of power, such nations as Turkey, Brazil, Holland, Sweden and the rest. Access to the resources of these nations will be necessary for the big four, either in war or in peace. The Moscow Declaration itself pledges a "general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states."

Careful thought will be necessary, in so far as such an organization is concerned with the use of force, not to repeat the mistakes of structure of the League of Nations, and not to make others equally serious.

While a mere alliance for military defense may be a proper form for the Big Four, it could scarcely be extended to include the whole world. In an alliance of the traditional type, each partner is bound by the acts of all the others. Of course they usually consult before acting, but the possibility remains that a rash provocation by one may commit the arms of all. With a relatively small number of stable allies, it is easier to keep joint policy unified and under control. But extending the alliance indefinitely would result in a dilemma. Either the alliance would be at the mercy of the separate decisions of a large number of states, any one of which might plunge it into difficulties, or a requirement of unanimous consent would prevent prompt action and might inhibit any action at all.

An alternative to such an alliance is a union which takes action as a result of majority vote—or a vote by some larger fraction. But here difficulties also arise. Are the several nations ready to delegate to a general international government enough of their power to remain bound, in matters of war and peace, by a vote that had gone against them? That may ultimately be possible, but at least for a transitional period it hardly seems likely. The big nations would not want to be bound by the decisions of the small. Small ones close to an aggressor, like Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries in this war, might wish for prudential reasons to remain neutral until the last possible moment; and indeed it might be in the interest of the anti-aggressor coalition to have them do so.

It would therefore seem to be in the interest both of the large nations and the small that the function of forestalling aggression by the threat of force be tacitly delegated, for the present at least, to a manageable concert of the relatively few great military powers. One of the main lessons of the last peace is that political forms in which those who participate are not ready to play their full parts will not work and may become dangerous by creating a false sense of security. Another is that you cannot create a true international government merely by devising political machinery; a solid community of interests has to exist as a cement for a government. Therefore it is well to begin by building up these interests, without giving the world organization too heavy a load to carry at the outset. And it is absurd to think of a police force that is not the instrument of a government—a government at least potentially more powerful than any of its constituent parts. This is as true internationally as on a smaller scale.

The Big Four would of course, as individual states, be members of the world organization. It would be their privilege, if proceeding against aggressors, to ask for the support of the organization as a whole. This support might be voted, and all members might com-

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ply with the majority vote. In this case there would come into being the equivalent of a truly international government and police force. It would also be possible, if support were requested and the organization as a whole did not wish to bind its members, for the nuclear alliance to ask and obtain its moral approval for action against aggression, plus adherence to the alliance by as many individual states as found it advisable to join the hostilities. That would be roughly parallel to the situation in the present war. Another possibility would be that the world organization would by majority vote call for action by the nuclear alliance, if the latter were not formally bound to obey a majority composed of the smaller states. Finally, in case the consensus of the world organization disapproved any use of force by the nuclear alliance in a specific instance, it could so vote, and the vote might have far-reaching effects, even though not legally binding on the Big Four. The way would always be open for a closer approach to a sovereign international state with full military powers, and as time went on this ambition might be realized. Even at the beginning, however, much could be done without depriving the major military powers as a group either of the initiative or of the freedom of action which is theirs in practical fact, and which their peoples are probably not yet ready formally to surrender to a world state.

How can the small nations be sure that one or more members of the nuclear alliance itself will not become imperialistic aggressors? They cannot be completely sure. But the chance of this might be greater if there were no nuclear alliance. Certainly they have not fared well under the old "balance of power." They can rely to some degree on the changing climate of world opinion, on the fact that after a successful settlement in this war none of the great powers will be driven by fear to seek new "strategic frontiers," and on the fact that as industrialism spreads over the world, imperialism becomes a less feasible course, even for the short run. Russia and the United States now have a settled anti-imperialist policy, while the British Empire is moving slowly toward converting its colonies into dominions, if not granting them complete freedom, rather than seeking to extend the colonial system. It is extremely unlikely that any of these nations or China would embark on a career of armed conquest.

It must be remembered that indispensable as the ultimate threat of force is in the process of government and the maintenance of the rule of law, it is far from the sole function of government, and is indeed essentially of no avail unless the parts of a state are held together by common interests of other kinds. There is no provision in the Constitution of the United States for coercion of the several states, and for many years the federal army was actually of less importance than the military forces of the states. What led to the strengthening of the federal government was the necessity for many common activities having to do with commerce, monetary and fiscal policies and the like. The United Nations will have much to do other than ordering armies and navies into action, if it is to amount to anything. It may at once do everything that the League of Nations did successfully—and that comprised a wide variety of activities, from arbitration of disputes and administration of mandates to the control of drugs and the work of the International Labor Organization and Office. It may do many other things of even more importance. If the nuclear alliance as a backlog of security successfully performs only its function of preventing the outbreak of major aggression, it will seldom or never be called into play, and the main international action can be of a more constructive nature, adapted to a truly representative international government.

Every time international organization is mentioned, extreme nationalists raise the issue of national "sovereignty." Is it conceivable that the United States would surrender any of its sovereign rights to a world government, or to some group of other nations? Sovereignty is one of those vague abstractions useful as fighting words but without much precision of meaning. The United States has in the past made many treaties with other powers, and some military alliances, agreeing to various limitations on its day-to-day right to act with complete independence. It is now bound by tariff agreements, agreements to arbitrate disputes and agreements to coöperate in various other ways. No nation would possess sovereignty unless it had the right to make such agreements. There is no chance that this nation will completely merge its government with that of any future larger unit, at least for decades to come. But there is nothing either in our tradition or in our present interests that could prevent us from entering into a large number of agreements with other nations for a highly varied list of special purposes. It is in this way that valid and enduring international institutions are likely to be built up.

Yet even at the start, there may be—and ought to be—an international judiciary before which disputes among members may be brought, an international assembly, constituted on some fair representative principle, for legislative purposes, and a council or cabinet to supervise such executive functions as may be delegated to the federation. We are not unfamiliar with the operation of such institutions even in the international field. They are the rudiments of government, and through their operation international constitutionalism would have its chance to grow. There might also be an international bill of rights—or, perhaps more fruitfully, of duties and privileges—to safeguard against anything like fascist oppression in the future. The Charter of the United Nations already adopted is a good beginning at such a declaration.

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America and a World Economy

WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, any measure to prevent or suppress future aggression by armed force is, like military victory in this war, merely negative. It decides what shall not be permitted, but does not fill the space thus created. Necessary as it is, it merely clears the stage for other action. It is unlikely that either the world as a whole or any one of the separate nations will long remain mobilized solely about a negative aim like *preventing* war.

People will fight sooner or later unless there is a peace worth preserving. Therefore the more important part of the task is to create such a peace. Since the necessary material basis of any good life is economic, and since international affairs are largely concerned with economic matters, it is necessary to ask what economic policies and institutions the United States ought, in its own interest, to favor.

In the eyes of Americans, the first objective is large and steady production of the things we want, coupled with full employment and a fair distribution of income in this country. Fortunately, that is also the necessary basis of economic welfare and progress in other countries as well. A thriving economy in the great industrial nations of the world is the *sine qua non* of economic health in the less industrialized regions. This is so because (a) these regions need to sell raw products and food to the industrialized peoples, who cannot buy enough without sufficient purchasing power; (b) these regions need to buy many manufactured products from the industrialized nations (especially capital goods and machinery necessary to increase their own output and economic stability) and cannot buy without selling; and (c) in many cases the less industrialized regions need to tap the surplus savings of the great manufacturing countries in order to build up their economies through investment of new capital.

There is a theory that the way to seek prosperity both at home and abroad is merely to remove any obstructions to private enterprise and let profit-seeking business take its natural course.

One immediate practical objection to this revived doctrine of laissez-faire is that the United States is the only important nation in the world in which there is the slightest chance of its being tried. Governmental controls and intervention find their extreme in a socialist state like the Soviet Union—which will bulk even larger in the postwar world than in the prewar—but also they will certainly play a large part in China, in Latin America, throughout Europe and even in Britain, where not even the conservatives believe any longer in pure laissez-faire. What this means is that we can try it at home if we want to, but we cannot impose it on the world.

This does not imply that the only alternative to unadulterated private enterprise is socialism. It does not imply that high tariffs and exchange-rigging are desirable policies, or that there should not be the utmost possible expansion of international trade and investment. What our policy ought to do, both at home and in foreign affairs, is to permit private enterprise to do what it can, so long as it does not pursue a course inimical to our main objectives, and to supplement that by whatever governmental action is necessary in addition, if these objectives are to be realized.

In spite of the great achievements of private enterprise, it is inclined to two major faults. One is private monopoly, or at least great aggregations of power, the net result of which is to restrict production and employment by maintaining higher prices than would result from competition. Negatively, it has in recent years failed to invest enough in new productive equipment to keep production and employment expanding, in view of the propensity of business and individuals to withdraw money from circulation by saving it.

We shall have to adopt a domestic policy to deal in some way with monopoly. When business interests are combined only on a national scale, their competition for foreign markets or control of resources brings international friction, and promotes colonialism and imperialism of the nineteenth-centry type. When, as often happens, this competition leads to business combination across national boundaries, international cartels are likely to exploit the consuming nations and populations, and to restrict output in the interest of high prices. In addition, especially during the years of depression, governments themselves have stepped in to help agricultural producers restrict output in the interest of higher prices.

It is most unlikely that unlimited competition can be restored to the international field. But the interest of the United States as a nation of 140,000,000 consumers, as well as the interest of the rest of the world as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, is in the fullest possible access to materials in order to satisfy consumers' needs and create the basis of worldwide increase in standards of living. During the war the Allied belligerents have united to expand the supplies of scarce materials and allot them to the most essential uses. This same machinery can and should be continued during the transition period of reconstruction. As a permanent policy we need an international trade agency or agencies which can assure the policy of expanding production instead of allowing combinations of producers free rein to exploit the unorganized consumers and create unemployment by unwarranted restriction of output. A step in this direction has been taken in

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one important area by the International Food Conference, which has based its whole program on the nutritional needs of the peoples of the world. In every case, where cartels or international commodity agreements set prices or limit production, it should be the business of such an agency to see that the interests of individual consumers and consuming nations are fully represented in the process.

The failure of private enterprise to invest enough money in new production in order to utilize all possible productive capacity and create full employment has been dramatically emphasized by the long depression beginning in 1929, as contrasted with the present war economy. For years we struggled along with millions of unemployed, and even had a large number out of work after we supposed "recovery" had arrived. Then came the tremendous expansion of production and employment after we began to prepare to fight. There is absolutely no other way to account for this expansion except that the government took the lead in spending money for the creation of new productive equipment, and of course provided a market for its product. This was not merely a *shift* of production and purchasing power from peacetime to wartime uses, it was *absolute expansion* of great and surprising amount. In spite of the demands of war production, civilian consumers in 1941 absorbed more goods and services than ever before in history. And since then the total national product has increased enormously. This is a giant demonstration of what we could do to turn out the goods necessary to an increase in standards of living in time of peace, if a way could be found to keep production and employment active and growing.

It may be objected that we do not want to continue a war economy, with its piling up of debt, its scarcities, rationings and compulsions. Certainly we do not. But there would be a big difference. Now, civilian consumers are getting an income at least half as large again as they can spend for available goods at present prices. The government is getting for war purposes the goods for the making of which this extra money is paid. If the factories were released from war production to supply civilian demand, and did actively supply it, three interlocking results would occur: (1) enough goods would be available for individual consumers so that shortages would disappear and people could spend their money without increasing prices, (2) the employment and income of consumers would be as large as at present, since they would be at work supplying the goods and services made for themselves, instead of being largely engaged in making war goods, and (3) the government would not have to spend nearly so much as at present. It would merely have to invest enough to keep the economy expanding, in so far as private business failed to do so. This amount might be large in contrast with pre-war government spending, but it would be relatively small in comparison either with its war spendings or with the new and greatly enlarged national income.

With such an active economy on the domestic front, we should buy large quantities of raw materials from Latin America, Asia and Africa, and we should buy large quantities of manufactured and luxury goods from Europe. In turn we should sell abroad large quantities of machinery, automobiles, aircraft and goods of many other kinds. The basis for a worldwide advance in standards of living would be laid.

Opportunities for investment of new capital in productive facilities are large in the United States, but they probably will not be large enough to absorb all we save out of such a gigantic national income, especially after the great wartime expansion of plant and equipment. In other lands less completely industrialized than ours, however, the opportunities for development have barely been touched—notably in Latin America and China. Such an activity, if carried on steadily and on a sound basis, would benefit both investing countries and those being developed.

If it is unlikely that private enterprise will invest enough at home, it is even more unlikely that it will invest enough abroad. The process of international investment needs to be planned and stimulated. The appeal must not be confined only to those willing to incur great risks and seeking to reap large speculative profits. Indeed, many countries will no longer accept foreign investment on such terms. Great basic developments need to be built, such as roads, railroads, power systems, river improvements, etc. And much needs to be invested in things not ordinarily regarded as a source of profit for foreign investors—such as the production of the food necessary for a diet of adequate nutritional value for the native population, sanitation, preventive medicine and health services. National-planning agencies and development corporations now exist in many countries of the world for the express purpose of improving the economic basis of the national life. More such agencies will be required. Some of them will be for the development of regions along the lines of the TVA, and where such regions are international in scope, the developmental agencies must themselves be international. Both national and international agencies will in many cases, however, lack the necessary capital to go ahead.

To supply this capital an international Reconstruction Finance Corporation or Investment Bank is desired. It must furnish the capital at low interest rates and for long terms. Being guaranteed by the participating governments, and having investments all over the world, it could provide safety for investing nations or citizens which no private banker or combination of banks could duplicate. But of course it would not eliminate private investment; rather by taking the lead it would encourage business enterprise of the ordinary type. Equally important in the preservation of future

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peace, it would, by internationalizing the control of large basic investments, prevent the exploitation of colonial or "backward" peoples, the political use of investments by single nations or interests within them, and the imperialistic competition among investing nations which has for years been a serious trouble-maker.

We shall need an agency to raise labor standards, and to extend social security on an international basis. We already have one, the International Labor Office of the League of Nations. This is one of the activities of the League to which the United States has for years adhered. But it can be made far more effective when international economic agencies exist to stimulate the production necessary as a basis of higher standards.

Much has been heard lately of plans for stabilization of international exchange, through a clearing system such as that suggested by Lord Keynes or a bank such as that suggested by Harry D. White of the United States Treasury Department. Either of these schemes could be made to work if both inflation and deflation could be avoided within the participating nations, an expanding world economy could be achieved and a sufficient flow of new investment could be maintained from the countries of surplus to the countries of deficit. Both would soon pass the limits of their ability to maintain stable exchanges if the world should suffer another great depression or international investment should dry up. Something of the sort is of course desirable as a substitute for, or improvement upon, the vanished gold standard.

This brief section is far from covering all the possibly desirable policies and instruments of positive international coöperation, and is far from describing in detail even those mentioned. But it does suggest the basic and most necessary elements, dictated by both American interest and international interest. They may be listed in summary as follows:

1. An expanding economy at home, to obtain full employment and a rising standard of living. This is to be assured by measures to (a) curb the limitations of output characteristic of private monopolistic practices, and (b) make enough governmental investment in useful improvements to compensate for any deficiency of investment by private enterprise.

2. An expanding economy on a world scale, to be assured by international institutions as follows:

(a) Trade agencies, or a single trade agency, to control in the interest of consumers international cartels or commodity agreements.

(b) An international RFC or Investment Bank, to expand and govern basic international investment according to developmental plans.

(c) An international labor agency to improve labor standards and advance standards of living.

(d) An international agency to stabilize currencies.

What Shall We Do with Germany?

THE TREATMENT of Germany is often discussed in a vacuum, as if the answer did not depend on the kind of world peace we intend to create. Too often it assumes that the world as a whole was healthy before the war, that it would have continued in peace and prosperity if it had not been for the Nazi-Fascist movement and the challenge of the Axis. All that has to be done, according to this thesis, is to cut out Germany as if it were a cancer in the body of humanity, or to render the Germans incapable of making war in the future.

It is not the present purpose to argue that Germany, Italy and Japan were not guilty of starting the war, or at least that the forces controlling their states were not guilty. Nor is it realistic to assume that the question of guilt is irrelevant, as if people were not moved by moral issues and as if ethical standards were not important in determining human action. If this were so, the enemies of the Axis would not have had sufficient stamina to wage the war itself and endure the sacrifices necessary for victory. They are fighting, not merely for self-preservation, but also against what they regard as wrong and detestable.

The Nazi doctrine that the Germans are a superior race entitled to rule, and that the right to do so arises from the fact that they are stronger, can be effectively answered only by proving in action that it is not true. For this reason we must avoid accepting the surrender of any government in Germany which may displace the present one, on the ground that the nation has reformed and is repentant, unless it is first clear to the Germans that surrender is a military necessity and that their power of further resistance is destroyed. In the last war we held out promises to the Germans that we would deal with a democratic state; a revolutionary government did appear and we accepted its surrender. This government no doubt acted in perfect good faith and intended to provide a reliable democratic regime which would keep the peace. Nevertheless the German army was able to create the belief that it had not been defeated, because Germany was not invaded, and that the nation had been betrayed by liberal and democratic forces behind the front. The German government which we wished to preserve received the onus of surrender and was regarded as having been tricked by the Allies into a disgraceful and insupportable peace. Hitler later used this argument with powerful effect. The nucleus of militarism and the officer caste was able to survive under the guise of the Reichswehr, and ultimately to resume the offensive.

If a conservative military regime should throw out the Nazis and sue for peace, we could not rely on its

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promises. But if Germany's military defeat were unmistakably clear to all, we should insist on surrender by the *army* or its responsible commanders and decline to accept it merely from any civil government, however revolutionary or anti-Nazi it might appear. The only condition under which we might safely deal with a revolutionary Germany without surrender by the army would be one in which the Germans themselves had successfully revolted both against the Nazis and their military leaders and had thoroughly cleansed themselves of the war guilt.

Once the lesson of the war itself were thus taught, and it was clear that the discredited elements in Germany would be those who promoted war rather than those who wanted peace, we should have to do our best to make the Germans a coöperative and useful part of the world order we were resolved to create. On the one hand, we should have to make sure that they would not again have the temptation or the opportunity to disturb the peace. But on the other hand, we should have to see that they *did* have the opportunity to participate fruitfully in the kind of life which the rest of the world permitted itself. The trouble with the last peace was that it did neither. The future peace must do both.

Whatever is done about German disarmament—and we assume that Germany will be disarmed—the main reliance against future militaristic adventures must be the nuclear alliance of Russia, Britain, the United States and China. This, with a world organization such as the United Nations back of it, could certainly discourage any new plans of conquest which might arise. In addition, a policy of expanding industry throughout the world, and especially in such potentially powerful states as China, would increase the preponderance of power which already is proving too much for German arms.

It is argued that even if Germany were deprived of weapons, she would still possess the industrial basis for a future armament industry, which she might decide to use at some future time. Therefore it is proposed either that Germany be dismembered or that German heavy industry be dismantled, in so far as it is not destroyed by the war, and that Germany not be permitted to rebuild it. But this is in direct opposition to the aim of increased productiveness and an improvement in standards of living throughout the world. The German people, without their efficient industrial system, would be pauperized, and their poverty would infect the entire world order. Germany must be given an opportunity to pursue the arts of peace if all of Europe at least is not to suffer. The territories that she herself has devastated will need the things that she can make.

If, in spite of the existence of guarantees of peace, a new aggressive leader should arise and Germany should begin to arm, the world economic organizations which are here proposed could be utilized at the very beginning to prevent her access to the necessary materials. She could be boycotted by the trade boards, the investment agency, the exchange control. If she then persisted in her course, military force could be called in. In these days of aerial warfare, no nation would be reckless enough to challenge a prepared and resolute world.

What about the apparent madness of the state of mind originating both in certain elements in the German culture and in Nazi doctrines? We must remember that Germany is not the first nation in the world which started out on a career of conquest and seemed to be the trouble-maker. For years it was Spain, then France. Even Sweden was once a conquering power. Peoples habituated to war and conquest can in the end become pacifist. After this unfortunate experience we may expect a different strain in the German culture to come to the top. If we make the kind of world in which all people—including Germans—cannot live by conquest, but can live at peace with security and enjoyment, we shall have created the major part of the conditioning which is necessary to alter their outlook.

America and the New Europe

THE GOVERNMENT of the United States has been suspect both in this country and in Europe because of its anti-democratic, and even at times pro-fascist tendency in choosing friends and agents among European regimes. This sorry story began with the policy of "non-intervention" in the Spanish civil war, when (in conjunction with Britain and France) we embargoed materials needed by the legitimate Spanish Republican government, while Franco's rebel Falangists were being aided by Italy and Germany. Far from recognizing the error of this policy, our government long remained on good terms with Franco, who in spite of the help he received from Washington has maintained a Spanish legion fighting with the German army against our Russian allies and has even had the impudence recently to congratulate the Filipino puppet whom Japan has placed in power. Our course in France and Italy has been as strongly criticized by democrats.

In spite of the obvious dislike of liberal and democratic Italians for the Savoy monarchy, we seem to have been keeping it in power and have chosen to support the government of Marshal Badoglio, who though declaredly anti-Fascist, is scarcely representative of the Italian people. The Declaration of Moscow has done much to alter this impression, but it needs to be translated into effective action if the distrust is to be completely removed.

The defense by the administration in these matters (at least since the war began) is that its course has been dictated by military expediency, and that every

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European people will be guaranteed the chance to choose its own form of government and its own rulers when the war is over. Even here, however, there was no hesitation on the part of Prime Minister Churchill to express the hope that Greece and Yugoslavia would restore to power their unpopular and anti-democratic kings. And what happens in the twilight-zone between the start of military activity in a given area and the final victory may play a decisive role in determining who wields the power after victory is won.

It is not easy to pick sides in the troubled situations which arise in countries like France and Italy and even more so in the Balkans. (Fortunately there will probably be less trouble in those countries where democracy was stable before the war, like Czecho-Slovakia, Holland, Denmark and Norway.) But the time when it may be argued that it is necessary to consult military expediency as against our professed principles and interest has come to an end as our arms have prospered. We are entitled to hope that the United States Government, representing a great and progressive democracy, will cease cutting the figure before European peoples of a timid Tory appeaser, a Chamberlain who is so afraid of the revolutionary bogey that he will not defend abroad the principles his own country stands for. The Declaration of Moscow supplies a good beginning of a new and better policy.

What About Russia?

With the success of the Moscow Conference, Soviet-American relations have become far better than might have been expected a year or two ago. Apparently a solid basis of coöperation has been achieved, both for war and post-war policies. With this settlement behind us, it is difficult to see what important issue can remain for the two nations to quarrel about. Yet in view of the facts that the Soviet Union is a socialist country, that doctrinaire Communists cannot have given up expecting eventual world revolution, and that the United States is not only a capitalist country but one in which hatred of Russia has been exploited by extreme reactionaries for years, the materials of possible friction certainly continue to exist.

This friction, however, can remain in the realm of opinion, and the opinion of a minority, so long as neither nation actively intervenes in the internal affairs of the other. We can be certain that the Soviet Union wants to keep our friendship for the sake of its own safety, and if we are wise, we shall reciprocate. The Russian and American peoples have much in common in temperament and outlook and are likely to be as friendly with each other as they are permitted to be.

Serious trouble is likely to develop only if our domestic and foreign policies are so inept that they give rise to widespread discontent at home and abroad, thus preparing the soil for a threatening movement of social revolution. But in that case the Soviet Union would be only one threat among many. The surest way to avoid danger from revolutionary agitation, or from foreign intervention in its behalf, is to construct and maintain an economy which is satisfactory to the people.

America and the Far East

In the far east the United States has at least one feather in its cap—its policy of recent years in the Philippines, and its legal promise of Philippine independence at a definite date—a date which may be advanced. American-Chinese friendship is traditional, and although troubles have arisen during the war because of our inability to give prompt and sufficient help to the Chinese while preparing to defeat the Axis in Europe, we may hope that this situation will rapidly improve.

Our greatest handicap in the Far East is the survival of imperialism in Britain and our other allies. The Indian muddle reflects discredit on us, through the very reluctance of our government to intervene. The Japanese have exploited British mistakes in Burma and the Malay States, French mistakes in Indo-China. No active and forward-looking policy has been adopted by the Allies as a whole regarding the Far East, to offset the Japanese "Co-Prosperity Sphere." This is necessary, not only as a political stratagem in the war, but as a solid basis of future peace. So far, about the only pronouncement on the subject has been Mr. Churchill's acid statement that he did not intend to preside at the dissolution of the British Empire.

It is well enough to concentrate on the military defeat of Japan; her mushroom empire will shrivel as quickly as it grew, once her sea-lanes are broken and she is thrown out of China. But what then? Can we keep Japan in permanent subjection by a large force of occupation?

Obviously, aside from the disillusionment which defeat will bring to the Japanese people and the internal changes which may result from it, our only safeguard in the future will be a strong and friendly China, and a Far Eastern regime which will offer no more room for imperialism, whether it be Japanese or European. The building up of China as a great and prosperous industrial power is the intention of the Chinese themselves, and we can help in that process tremendously by the economic measures outlined above. The rest of the problem requires far more constructive and serious consideration than has yet been given it. With the Moscow Conference out of the way, the next great step on the agenda should be a conference with China to lay plans for peace in Asia.

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The American Peace Mind

IN CONSIDERING THE ATTITUDE of Americans toward the problems of peace, it is necessary to recall some recent history. Contrary to a commonly expressed view, majority opinion in the United States was not isolationist at the close of the last war. Newspaper polls of that day, while not taken with the scientific accuracy of the present time, were on the whole reliable; they showed throughout the country a ratio of three to one in favor of joining the League of Nations. The proportions did not vary between the supposedly interventionist East and the supposedly isolationist Middle West. Even in the Senate there was always a majority in favor of adhering to the League Covenant, including Article X. If President Wilson had been willing to accept the compromise offered him, he could have obtained Senate confirmation of the treaty on terms which, as it afterward turned out, would have fulfilled all his essential purposes. It was only his stubbornness that prevented this solution.

The Republicans in 1920 did not run on an isolationist platform. A group of distinguished members of the party signed a joint statement that the election of Harding would not be an isolationist step, and Harding himself accepted this point of view. It was only after he was elected that he changed.

It is true, however, that in the next few years there was increasing disillusionment about Europe and about the League of Nations. Americans learned for the first time about the secret treaties which had nullified some of Wilson's idealistic war aims long before those aims were ever publicly expressed. They saw the sorry farce of reparations and war debts played out in an atmosphere of hypocrisy and unreality (an atmosphere, it must be added, to which the United States contributed by refusing to accept its new role as a creditor nation and by insisting on a large "favorable" balance of trade which made it extremely difficult for its foreign debtors to meet their obligations). As the years passed, the Americans witnessed the League of Nations being used increasingly as a cloak for openly imperialistic ambitions on the part of all the member great powers. Finally, they saw the British and French, who were unable to decide jointly either to keep Germany permanently crushed or to make her a real friend and equal, themselves torn apart by common mistrust and hostility. They saw Hitler take advantage of this rift between his enemies to rearm Germany for the purpose, which was apparent at least five or six years before September 1, 1939, of waging war. Through a whole decade they saw the League demonstrate its inability to prevent Japan's seizure of Manchuria, Italy's seizure of Ethiopia and Albania, Hitler's march into the Ruhr, Russia's attack on Finland. They saw the limitation of naval armament set up in Washington in 1922 destroyed by the very powers that had brought it into being.

Yet these successive and sometimes simultaneous spectacles did not drive the Americans into complete cynicism and disillusionment. So far as can be judged, our public opinion really took seriously the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which attempted the utter absurdity of abolishing war by a self-denying ordinance, without at the same time making the slightest effort to remedy the underlying causes of war. The country as a whole approved the changed attitude toward Latin America which President Roosevelt described as the "Good Neighbor" policy, a policy which had begun some years before he first took office. Each of the successive international "disarmament" conferences was hailed hopefully in advance, and the people invariably seemed shocked and surprised when they produced no results, or bad ones. "Federal Union" mustered a surprising amount of support among well meaning people throughout the country who, with many others, simply could not understand why the nations continued to threaten, or to make, war, when war was so obviously a bad thing.

Throughout this whole period of a quarter of a century the Americans have continued to pour out a steady stream of advice to the peoples of Europe, Asia and Latin America. The average person in this country, to judge by all the evidence available, has seemed to feel that the troubles in these other parts of the world are due chiefly to the moral inferiority of their peoples to ourselves and to believe that if this were only pointed out strongly enough, they might reform.

At the present time the opinion polls of the professional agencies indicate that American public opinion as a whole is about the same as it has been for the past several decades. According to the American Institute of Public Opinion, it favored the Fulbright resolution in the House, supporting post-war coöperation, by 78 to 9 percent. A British alliance got a vote of 61 to 25, and even a Chinese alliance, 56 to 23. Catholic Church and other conservative influences are probably reflected in the vote on a Russian alliance, which was favored by only 39 to 37. Americans support an international police force in precisely the same proportion found in Great Britain, 75 to 17. The Elmo Roper poll, quoted in Fortune, recorded only 13 percent for isolationism and 25 percent for coöperation, without commitments to other nations. Fifty-six percent in this poll favored a police force. In another poll, 82 percent wanted to attempt to keep peace throughout the world, while 11 percent felt we should stay in this hemisphere.

It is an interesting and in some ways a disturbing fact that the public-opinion polls almost always turn

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out to be better and nobler than the actions of the country itself as expressed in Congress. The polls are also better than the attitudes of most of the professional opinion-molders, such as the editorial writers on the great metropolitan dailies, or the majority of the radio commentators. For this there are no doubt several reasons. For one thing, one incurs no real responsibility in answering the questions of a professional poll-taker. One can represent himself as being a little purer and nobler than he is in fact.

The second fact, a really serious one, is that the genuine centers of power in this country do not lie in the elements readily accessible to the poll-takers. They lie among the spokesmen for economic, political and religious groups—business men, farmers, trade unionists, churches, political parties. The poll-takers consult a great many people whose voices are not really heard in the halls of Congress, and whose opinions do not count for much in the editorial offices of the great metropolitan newspapers.

It is nevertheless a solid truth that the bulk of the American people at this moment want permanent peace throughout the world and are willing to contribute substantially to bring this about. It is quite true that so far as public opinion is concerned, the United States is at the present time the most altruistic of the great powers. While a few hasty and greedy persons talk about our retaining air bases on foreign soil throughout the world, or other special privileges, most Americans want nothing out of this war except that it shall not happen again.

Yet there are elements of danger in this situation. Probably most Americans do not realize how heavy the cost of permanent peace may be. If for instance it were necessary for us to keep any large body of troops outside the United States for any length of time, tremendous pressure would be exerted by these troops and their relatives at home to end the tour of foreign service, and there would be equal pressure against sending out replacements. Most authorities believe that if peace is to be maintained, some international authority must be directly concerned with all foreign investments, the allocation of raw materials internationally, and competition of various countries to sell goods in world markets. Very few Americans have given any thought to such matters, and if these controls are proposed, one can well imagine the roar that will arise that "free enterprise" is being stifled.

It is unfortunate that so much emphasis has been put upon the purely negative idea of an international police force to keep the peace, as though this were the only thing necessary. We seem to be repeating the old simple-minded mistake of the League of Nations that you can maintain the status quo if only you have an army with which to do so. Yet it should be clear by now that there is no hope of peace unless the causes of war are ameliorated.

Public Opinion and the Peace

FOR THE FAILURE of Americans to think about these causes, or to be prepared for any action regarding them, the instruments of popular education in this country, the press, the radio, the motion pictures, the church and the school must bear a heavy load of responsibility. All of them have largely evaded this issue, and all for the same reason: because some of the chief causes of war are so largely identical with the social organization out of which they spring and on which they batten.

Most newspapers are conservative, in that they support the prevailing business interest of the community. Sometimes this support is covert, but often it is open. Even when newspapers are "liberal," seeking a wide circulation among workingmen and their families, this liberalism often does not go very deep and is likely to expend itself on simple, popular crusades for new boulevards, or increased kindness to animals. A ready example of sheets of this sort are the papers of W. R. Hearst, who is extremely rich, extremely conservative, yet manages to maintain a fictitious air of liberalism in his columns which helps to cause millions of people to read them every day under the illusion that Hearst, like themselves, is against "the interests."

The radio on the whole shares and exaggerates the faults of the press, when it comes to the question of preparing the public mind for the problems of the postwar order. The radio is excessively timid; like the newspaper, it is for the most part heavily tinged with the coloration of big business and conservatism. While it allows a few individual commentators to present the liberal point of view, and some of them do so with great effectiveness, most of its material is weighted toward conservatism, which in this case means clinging to the old order which has produced wars before and if unchecked will do so again.

The motion picture is, of course, potentially an educational force of great value. The peculiar limitations of the industry as now set up, however, make it painfully ineffective in a struggle of this sort. Hollywood is controlled by men who are strongly conservative, who lack both the imagination and the will to envision a reorganized world, or to help achieve it.

As for the church and the school, they mirror the confusion of the society of which they are a part. Whatever may be the attitude and wishes of the individual teacher or clergyman, they find themselves perforce spokesmen for the prevailing economic and political forces of the community in which they operate. Only in a narrow and precarious sense can they help to make policy on any such vital issue as America's role in the postwar world. For the most part they will, because of pressure or for other reasons, serve only to mirror the attitude of the prevailing forces.

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The Parties and the Peace

IT IS A CURIOUS ANOMALY that in recent years the Republican Party should have become identified with isolationism and with states' rights. Until the First World War the exact opposite was true; the Republicans were the spokesmen for the industrial Northeast, and their prevailing philosophy was that of imperialism abroad and centralization at home. But the Democrats were in power during the years, from 1912 to 1920, when the nation was required by the force of circumstance to abandon isolationism in favor of participation in a world war, a war which also demanded concentration of power in the hands of the federal government in Washington. Having put these policies into effect, the Democrats felt obliged to support them in theory, despite their previous decades-long position as the defenders of "little Americanism" and states' rights. The Republicans, wanting to turn the Democrats out of office and being without much important difference of opinion on any other subject, felt obliged to oppose the Democrats in theory. There was also the fact that federal activity during these years was on the whole of a sort displeasing to big business. It included, for instance, laws for the protection of labor and heavier taxes than formerly. The Republicans turned to states' rights partly because they thought they could get more favorable treatment in the state capitals than they could at Washington.

At the present time, the Republican Party has no clear-cut foreign policy of its own. In so far as it represents the manufacturing interests which are largely centered in the Northeast, it is divided. Some of its supporters, who manufacture for the domestic market, have no ambition to sell abroad, and want high tariffs and low taxes. Others—the automobile manufacturers are a good example—want to sell throughout the world and are not afraid to compete with anybody in any country as to price and quality, believing that American mass-production methods can offset any supposed advantage derived from low wages elsewhere.

The farmers of the Middle West are predominantly Republican by tradition. Although they produce to some extent for export, few of them are acutely conscious of this, and their attitudes and mental processes are on the whole those of the conservative manufacturing interests which dominate the party.

The bankers are similarly divided. Although some of them work on a worldwide scale and are in certain instances strongly internationalist in their attitude, many more do not realize the extent of their own international commitments, and confine their conscious political activities to the demands for low wages and taxes, and for high prices, here at home. In these circumstances, it is more important to most Republicans to have a presidential candidate who can win the next national election than it is to have one who represents their own set of ideas about the future of the world. The personality and attitude of the individual candidate therefore become of outstanding importance.

At this juncture, Wendell Willkie is substantially in the lead for the nomination. Nearly all the professional Republican politicians dislike him, but they disliked him just as much in 1940, when he was able to get the nomination in spite of them; and he is much stronger politically, especially in relation to these politicians, now than he was then. Willkie is a strong supporter of American participation in world affairs.

The second contender for the Republican presidential nomination, it is generally agreed, is Gov. Thomas Dewey of New York State, despite the fact that he has promised explicitly that he will stay in office until his term expires in 1946. Dewey is a young man, without much political experience or any particular political convictions, beyond those needed for smashing rackets. On the eve of the Mackinac Island Republican conference on foreign policy, he startled the country by coming out in favor of an alliance with Great Britain. At the Herald Tribune Forum he seemed to feel that "free enterprise" was the solution for everything.

Governor Bricker of Ohio concealed his views on practically all issues until the formal announcement of his candidacy. On foreign affairs, his position seems to be an even milder version of international coöperation than the Mackinac Island resolution. Like Governor Warren of California, he is chiefly running for President on his family life and his genial manner.

Senator Taft of Ohio is rarely mentioned as a candidate, yet some political experts believe he wants the nomination. Senator Taft is one of the few really dangerous isolationists in the Senate—dangerous in the sense that his personal qualities are such as would make him an extremely quarrelsome and intransigent occupant of the White House. Luckily, he is possessed of so little political sex appeal that it seems most unlikely that he would be nominated, and if he were nominated the chance of a Democratic victory would be tremendously enhanced.

There is also General Douglas MacArthur, for whom a semi-spontaneous boom is in progress. No one knows much about MacArthur's views on public affairs, but we do know that his main support thus far has come from dangerous isolationist and even protofascist forces.

What foreign policy may be expected in case of a Democratic victory at the polls next year? Obviously this depends upon the Democratic candidate. Since nearly everyone is agreed that the Democrats probably cannot win without Mr. Roosevelt, the question can be restated: what would be Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy during the next four years?

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The answer to that question since the Moscow agreements differs radically from the answer that would have been made before those agreements took place. Prior to Moscow, it seemed fairly clear that Mr. Churchill was the dominating figure in the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. Mr. Churchill, and the party in England for which he is spokesman, have never heretofore given any sign that they consider this a war for democracy, or one to end imperialism, or anything else except a war to destroy the aggression of the fascist countries. The best guess is that the British government probably hoped for two postwar understandings, one with the United States, which would divide control of the sea lanes of the world, and one with Russia, which would divide control of the land mass of Europe.

If such were the intentions, they have been considerably altered by Moscow. This is not to say that the British did not know what they wanted when Mr. Eden entered the parleys; it is only to say that by then, London had been deeply impressed by the logic of recent events, of which the foremost was that the Russians were winning the European war with small (although certainly very important) help from the rest of the United Nations. Russia had doubtless indicated in preliminary conversations that she was prepared to coöperate in the postwar world on a basis of less power politics and more internationalism than had been supposed. At the same time, the drift of American sentiment as revealed by the Fulbright resolution, the Mackinac Island conference and the Senate debate on the Connally resolution, had shown that the American people were far less inclined toward postwar isolationism than they were a quarter of a century earlier.

With Mr. Roosevelt in the presidential chair for another four years, it is safe to say that he would move as much in the direction of international coöperation as the public opinion of the country would permit him to do. He would prefer, by reason of his temperament, to exert American influence through personal contacts with other leaders—Churchill, Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek—rather than through legalistic forms of an American delegation to an association of nations; but this does not mean that his would be a bad influence.

In considering the future, we must recognize that the Churchill government may not continue indefinitely in power. It might be succeeded eventually by a government much farther to the Left. In that case the general rule would be valid, that international harmony is almost always favored by governments of the Left. Roosevelt would certainly get on better with a British labor government than any Republican who could possibly be nominated and win the election.

As far as concerns the Democratic Party in general, we must remember that its two main elements are again the predominantly agrarian South and the big-city machines of the predominantly industrial North. The Southern agrarians are parochial in their outlook and strikingly xenophobic. They sell cotton on a world market, but this does not alter their general attitude of little Americanism. Now that they at last feel free to assert fully their repudiation of and hatred for New Deal liberalism, they have returned to an attitude almost precisely the same as that of the equally bitter conservatives in the Republican Party. Certainly they are closer in every way to these conservatives than they are to the liberals of their own party, as they have proved by their actions in Congress.

As for the Democratic machines in the big cities of the North, they are, as always, concerned almost solely with getting jobs for their followers, some of them federal positions but the greater part those in local city and county offices. Foreign-born groups affect their political outlook to a limited degree, as for instance, with the Boston Irish, who hate the British. The Catholic Church is heavily represented, and swings these groups somewhat toward hostility to Russia, friendship for the fascist regime in Spain and, until it collapsed, toward fascism in Italy. On the whole, however, it may be said that the Democrats of the North are practically destitute of political ideas on either foreign or domestic issues.

While prophecy is dangerous, on the law of averages it is safe to predict that our relations with the rest of the world would be better under a continuing Democratic administration than under the Republicans. All the most dangerous isolationist-imperialist forces in the country are enrolled under the Republican banner. The business interests which, without perhaps being consciously imperialistic, would tend in that direction, are Republican. Some of the Republican candidates, as indicated above, would have a policy dangerous to world-wide coöperation and friendship.

This is not to say, of course, that as to foreign policy, the Republicans are a monolithic body. They are pulled in various directions, and their policies are subject to change with the passage of time. In so far as the Republican Party is the party of private capitalism, it is worth pointing out that, in general, the trend of capitalism over the past forty years has been toward greater internationalism; the nationalist movements have usually been fomented by agrarian groups or by unscrupulous political adventurers, of whom Hitler is the supreme example. This business internationalism has frequently been of the most timorous character, and it is far from having pursued a consistent policy. It has for instance appeased fascism in one country after another, if it felt that such appeasement made momentarily for the greater safety of its investments. It has in several countries and over many years been dominated by the fear of revolution from the Left, which might confiscate part or all of its wealth.

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Business Looks Toward the Peace

IT IS A MISTAKE to think of "business" in the United States as a unit, all sections of which have the same views and policies. Even agriculture and labor have their right and left wings, their large and small components, their internal differences. Business is less cohesively organized than either, and extends all the way from the giant super-corporation with international affiliations, to the corner newsstand. What is good for one part of business (*e. g.*, protective tariffs or monopoly) may be bad for another.

That may be the reason why business is not so good at formulating practical programs as at putting over fighting slogans, usually directed against government or some other interest in the community. What usually happens is that a special business group decides what it wants in its own interest, and then sugar-coats the pill with some meaningless phrase which may appeal to the prejudices of other parts of the business community and as many voters as possible, including even large sections of farmers and workers. At present the popular business slogan is preservation of "free enterprise" and enmity to the "bureaucrats."

When we penetrate this smoke-screen to see what business really wants in the post-war period, we find a large variety of attitudes. There are a few business Bourbons, some of them large and powerful, some of them medium-sized and some small, who look forward to liquidating unions, social security and progressive legislation after the war, much as they tried to do a quarter-century ago. They are against governmental regulation of any sort, either nationally or internationally. They are now trying their best to bring about inflation, which will swell their profits and reserves—*vide* the cynical opposition of the National Association of Manufacturers to any further increase in taxation. The insiders are fully aware that inflation will be followed by depression and unemployment, but they think they are strong enough to ride out the storm financially, and it would help both in their war against labor and in eliminating competitors. As far as international government is concerned they are rabid nationalists, but the big companies among them are prepared to assume international business and financial rule by a process of economic imperialism and the extension of unregulated cartels.

This group is of course careful to conceal its true aims, and has been successful in gaining a good deal of support from political opponents of the administration, from the leaders of conservative farm organizations, whose constituents in the end must suffer by inflation, from those antagonized by organized labor's efforts to maintain its standards under war conditions, and from those annoyed by the dislocations and regulations of the war economy. But it is far from having the business field to itself, as it seemed to have after the last war.

By far the largest portion of business opinion believes that American democracy, which it regards as a favorable environment for private enterprise, cannot survive mass unemployment after the war, or another major depression. These employers are haunted by nightmares of millions returning from the armed forces, unable to find jobs because of the cessation of government war orders. They have, for the most part, accepted as permanent institutions collective bargaining with free unions and social security, though they do not want the latter to take the place of large employment supplied by private industry. Internationally, they are just as keen as anybody on stable organization to prevent another world war.

These elements in business, however, are far from having translated their views into a workable program. They often say to each other that drafting and executing such a program is the responsibility of private enterprise, because if business fails, government and labor are sure to take over. The most ambitious endeavor in this direction is the Committee for Economic Development. It declares that full employment and an expanding economy are its aims. With the aid of government economists, it has worked out an embryo production program, based on estimates of the civilian demands for goods and services which would arise from full employment in times of peace. It is translating these demands into detailed schedules for the separate industries, attempting to show how many automobiles, refrigerators, radios, etc., would be sold under such conditions. The theory is that if each industry proceeds to make these goods, the requisite employment will be furnished, and the goods will find a market.

So far, however, the CED has not found an answer to the question whether industry will or can proceed to make the full total of goods required (and no more than are required in any one category). How shall the individual concerns decide how much each can safely make, even if they know the extent of the possible total market? How can such a program be worked under a competitive regime, and if competition is abandoned, what about the anti-trust laws? The CED has excluded labor from its deliberations, and tends to keep government at arm's length. It is decidedly cool to any proposal that government shall guarantee to take up any slack through investment in public works or deficit spending.

A much smaller group, though one which contains a number of the most influential and intelligent business executives, is adopting a fundamentally sounder approach. Yet it also has not found the answers to many of the important specific problems. Typical of

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this element is the work of the National Planning Association. The business men in this association are working on terms of equality with important leaders of organized labor and agriculture. Three standing committees, one concerned with the interests of business, one with agriculture and one with labor, meet separately to define their ideas, and then come together to formulate programs. They have already agreed on major objectives and general principles. They favor, of course, full employment and rising standards of living, social security, international coöperation and the preservation and strengthening of the democratic process. The concept of private enterprise is broadened to include the function of all three, and the respective rights and duties of each group have been roughly defined. Government is not excluded from the picture; indeed its importance is emphasized, not as an employer, but as a coördinator and administrator of policies democratically agreed upon, and as an essential element in the achievement of the agreed economic aims through a correct fiscal policy.

It is impossible to tell what the influence of business on the peace will be. It may exert several countervailing influences. But the process is in flux, and the field is open for leadership armed with a strong and constructive program which can cut under the disruptive activities of the Bourbons.

Labor and the Peace

IT IS A TRUISM to say that the American labor movement is only now coming of age. For reasons too numerous and complicated to list, American trade unions have lagged politically thirty or forty years behind those of the Western European countries. While across the ocean labor parties have arisen, usually strongly socialist in their sympathies, and have actually come to power in several countries, in the United States we have only the rudimentary beginnings of any political consciousness at all and a national labor party seems out of the question. In fact, such a party is legally almost unattainable; more than one state makes it difficult or impossible for a new party to find a place on the ballot, so that any group that is prepared, because of its numerical strength, to make a bid for power must do so by capturing the organization of the Republicans or the Democrats.

For many years, trade unions went with the prevailing political sentiment of their community. In the North they went Republican in the smaller towns, Democratic in the big cities; in the South, such comparatively few and feeble unions as existed of course voted Democratic. The old policy was supposed to be that labor voted for its friends, which usually meant the candidate who, before election, made the most sweeping promises to it. Labor was rarely equipped to study the careers of its supposed friends after they got into office, and showed little interest in doing so. Throughout large sections of the country, the Republican Party persuaded the workers to swallow whole the specious argument that high tariffs, which prevented the entry of goods produced by the "half-starved workers of Europe and Asia," protected the high wages of the American workingman.

The political immaturity of the American labor movement prevented it from playing any real role in the international activities of labor, even before the First World War had proved that these activities were of negligible importance compared to the nationalist passions aroused with the beginning of armed conflict. It is little exaggeration to say that the American labor movement had no real contact with labor in other countries until after 1918. Thereafter, for two decades mostly marked by severe depression in the United States, labor was concerned mainly with fighting a defensive rearguard action at home. One might record, however, that the trade-union movement at the beginning was strongly in favor of the League of Nations, and was instrumental in creating the highly useful International Labor Office.

Aside from this, such international labor activity as was seen was largely centered around the Communists. As part of their general political activity, the Communists infiltrated the American labor movement, influencing many unions and gaining control of a few. Their activities have been such as to widen, rather than to narrow, the gulf between themselves and the more conservative elements in American labor.

At present it is fair to say that the spirit of most American labor is still on the whole conservative, and more concerned with direct struggles with employers over wages, hours and other conditions than with political considerations. American workers are certainly a long way from joining hands in any effective sense with those of other countries.

At the same time there are some hopeful elements in the situation. Both the AFL and the CIO are beginning for the first time to show a definite interest in postwar problems and in planning for a sane and orderly world. Both national groups have shown definite interest in the postwar international planning studies of the National Planning Association, the Twentieth Century Fund, the Foreign Policy Association and similar bodies. More important, a group of unions has set up the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, efficiently organized to study questions in which labor is interested and to recommend to its constituent unions appropriate action.

There is no doubt that the movement of American labor is toward greatly increased political action. If we shall not see a labor party, we are likely to see labor candidates for office, whose actions if they are elected will be subject to greater control than ever before.

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A SPIRITUAL DYNAMIC

Religion can and must be creative. Religion, in pointing to the ideal, should guard men's motives against hate, selfishness, and arrogance. It should also grant a total view of life, assuaging griefs and sorrows, while renewing hope and clarifying vision.

The Church Peace Union and *World Alliance* represent an interfaith body of men and women, who are convinced that all human beings are equally precious in God's sight and that the blessings and privileges of our common life must be shared by all. As a step to this end, they had a share in initiating a PATTERN FOR PEACE, setting forth the principles for a new world order, recently signed by 146 leaders of Catholic, Jewish and Protestant churches and agencies of the United States. To this statement they give their unqualified support. In brief, the seven principles for a New World Order center on these imperatives:

1. **The Moral Law Must Govern World Order.**
2. **The Rights of the Individual Must Be Assured.**
3. **The Rights of Oppressed, Weak, or Colonial Peoples Must Be Protected.**
4. **The Rights of Minorities Must Be Secured.**
5. **International Institutions to Maintain Peace With Justice Must Be Organized.**
6. **International Economic Cooperation Must Be Developed.**
7. **A Just Social Order Within Each State Must Be Achieved.**

The Church Peace Union and *World Alliance* believe that pronouncements are futile unless implemented by social sanctions and political action. They are, therefore, devoting all their facilities to a program of effectiveness for the seven principles in the following ways:

—Cooperation with local, state, and religious groups in strengthening the peace programs of the churches;

—Promotion of the study of world order through committees in the local churches;

—Counsel with church workers on special problems of peace education through an INFORMATION SERVICE:

—Publication of a monthly NEWS LETTER, as well as pamphlets and study packets for the use of religious groups and individuals.

—Joint action with such organizations as the United Nations Association, Citizens for Victory, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Council for Democracy, International Free World Association, The Christian Conference on War and Peace, Freedom House, and others in holding WIN THE WAR—WIN THE PEACE INSTITUTES in strategic centers of the nation.

—Establishment of a local unit to coordinate all post-war study efforts in such communities.

The Church Peace Union and *World Alliance* are convinced that the realization of a better world order depends upon the devotion and cooperative effort of every individual.

THE
CHURCH PEACE UNION
REV. WILLIAM P. MERRILL, D.D., *President*

WORLD ALLIANCE for INTERNATIONAL
FRIENDSHIP through the CHURCHES
RT. REV. G. ASHTON OLDHAM, D.D., *President*

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Interested persons are invited to send for sample copies of the WORLD ALLIANCE NEWS LETTER, published monthly. Membership in the World Alliance includes a subscription to the NEWS LETTER and the use of the INFORMATION SERVICE. Special quantity rates for churches and schools. Individual memberships, $1.00 per year. Contributing Associate, $5.00 per year. Supporting Associate, $10.00 or more per year. Make all checks and money orders payable to Edgar J. Fisher, Treasurer, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N. Y.

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The Catholics and the Peace

IT USED TO BE SAID that there was an important difference between the Catholic Church in Europe and in the United States. In Europe the Church was definitely and openly in politics, with clerical parties which offered their own candidates for office, frequently held the balance of power and sometimes took actual control. In the United States, on the other hand, the Church worked only behind the scenes and mainly in the realm of social and cultural controls, through campaigns against birth control, obscenity in the press and the movies, and so on.

This distinction, however, is rapidly losing whatever reality it once had. With the deepening world crisis of recent years, the Church has come out more and more openly as a political organization with important political aims and ambitions, both here and abroad. There seems no doubt that Catholic influence strongly affected the American policy of hostility toward Russia during the first fifteen years of the USSR. It is equally certain that Catholic pressure caused the United States to discriminate against the Loyalists (under the guise of a fictitious impartial neutrality) in the Spanish civil war. Historians may very well say that the outcome in Spain, more than any other single factor, was responsible for emboldening Hitler into starting the Second World War. Also, the attitude of American Catholics toward Italian fascism, like that of the Vatican itself, was a dubious one, to say the least. Certainly the outside world got the impression that both the Vatican and American Catholicism were supporting Mussolini most of the time on both issues.

Yet the Church is by no means a monolithic body, in this country or anywhere else. There are various contending groups within its ranks, and the general Church policy is a flexible one that changes with the changing times; if this were not so, it could not have survived so long as it has done. The touchstone of Catholic policy has been the attitude of various countries and various political groups toward the Church itself, as well as the social philosophy of these countries and groups. The Church fought Russia not only because the Russians were hostile to organized religion but because Russia practised socialism, which is anathema despite the vague pronouncements of some of the Popes in its favor. The Church has been reasonably friendly toward the fascist countries, though some of them have persecuted Catholics, on the ground that fascism, after all, represented economic conservatism. The statement of the American Catholic Bishops and Archbishops on the Moscow Pact seems to be based on fear of Russia's future influence in the world. The Church came to terms satisfactorily with fascism in Italy, Spain and more than one Latin American country.

At the same time, it is obvious that we have not seen the end of the chapter in regard to this matter. In the Church in America there are powerful and vocal pro-democratic elements. Also, it is becoming more and more evident that the fascist powers are losing the war. Unless we mishandle the peace disgracefully, democratic ideas should be at a premium at least for some time to come.

Isolationists and the Peace

HOW MUCH ISOLATIONISM is there now in the United States? What effect is it likely to have after the war?

If one studied only the recent congressional debates on the Fulbright resolution in the House and the Connally resolution in the Senate, one would be forced to assume that isolationism has all but disappeared. The participants in the Senate debate argued, not whether the United States should assume a share of the post-war obligation for keeping the peace, but about the wording of the resolution, on the question whether the exact extent of that obligation should now be stated. Only six men finally opposed the resolution, which embodied word for word the most important agreement at Moscow. Yet the isolationists are still with us and they will play an important role when the war is over.

One way in which isolationism expresses itself is in the demand for an alliance with Great Britain, not as a preliminary to a new and worldwide association of nations but as an alternative to such an association. Isolationism expresses itself in purely destructive criticism of the present administration and the way the war is being fought. The demand that we should retain permanently military bases all over the world is isolationist; so is the threat that we intend to inaugurate cutthroat competition with our present allies.

Isolationism in the post-war world would certainly mean not only nationalism but imperialism. If America wanted to live aloof from the rest of the world, she would obviously have to have a large army, navy and air force to protect herself against sudden assault. But since we are not self-sufficient as to raw materials needed in war, we should also need to control in some form certain areas far outside our own boundaries, to make sure that our needed raw materials would not be cut off in case of armed conflict. This would mean that we could not tolerate governments, in those countries, which might prove unsympathetic to us. Neither could we permit any alliance to grow up, in any part of the world, that was hostile or potentially hostile to ourselves. The effort to live alone would probably wind up by seeing us more engaged in world affairs than ever.

The mark of Cain on the isolationist is that while he talks glibly about participation in worldwide efforts to keep the peace, he is unwilling to make any specific

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WATER, BLOOD OR GASOLINE?

WE AMERICANS SEEM DETERMINED not to make the same mistakes this time about peace that we made after World War I. But the mistakes we are making now also lead to war again.

After World War I we decided that the way to keep out of war was to have no international organization but trust to public opinion to run the world peacefully. It would have been less dangerous tommyrot had we argued that the way to make an automobile run is to put some hay ahead of the horsepower.

NOW most Americans admit we need some kind of world organization—some fuel "that ain't hay"—but many think that any kind of organization will do. They concede the fuel must be liquid, but assume that any liquid will work—water, blood or gasoline. How often the "experts" tell them:

"Don't bother about the details. There are good arguments for using water, blood or even gasoline (though it's most expensive). It really doesn't matter which one you use, so long as you use a liquid, and not hay."

Then there are the peacemakers who say: "Let's all be good fellows and compromise—pour into the tank one-third water, one-third blood and one-third of this crackpot's gasoline."

ABC . . . It is high time we Americans recognized (A) that there's a right way and a wrong way in political science as in physical science, (B) that being practical consists—for anyone but a politician—in choosing the way that works when tried, not in backing the way that gains votes most easily, and (C) that to make the peace machinery run we must pay very careful attention to some details, and to several of them at once, just as—to make an automobile run—we must use not only the right liquid but several of them and keep each where it belongs, the gasoline in the tank, the water in the radiator and the blood in the driver's veins.

WE FEDERAL UNIONISTS do not tell you that you can get peace if only you organize the nations some way, unite them all on the same principle—all league, all alliance, or all federation.

We say that you have to organize the nations on two different principles at the same time; that you must (1) put behind peace and freedom the power they need by uniting certain free peoples—those with the strongest natural ties—on a full federal union basis; and (2) keep this powerful Union of Democracies running coolly by having it operate within a league composed of all the sovereign nations—within another kind of international organization weaker than a Union in structural principle but as universal as water.

WE WELCOME the Moscow Declaration and the Senate and House Resolutions as groundwork for the second requirement and clearing the way for the first essential, the constitution of a Federal Union of the Free. We appeal to all those who keep their feet on the ground and their eyes looking ahead to join with us in achieving the great task remaining before us. Here is the policy statement of Federal Union, Inc., adopted unanimously by the delegates of our country-wide membership at our 1943 National Convention in Peoria, Ill., November 13.

THE POLICY OF FEDERAL UNION

We Federal Unionists believe that, if a free society is to exist anywhere in the world, the United Nations must win a complete victory over the Axis dictators and militarists, and establish a just and durable peace.

We believe that an international organization to include all the peoples of the world is essential to peace, to international law and order, and to the economic progress and spiritual development of mankind. We urge the prompt creation of such an international organization.

But this is not enough. The ultimate condition for a just and lasting peace is a federal union of all mankind. As the first step toward this end and as the best way to win the war and extend those basic freedoms for which we are fighting, we believe that we, the people of the United States, should lead in forming *now*, a nuclear Federal Union of all those peoples willing and able to accept an international federal constitution, assume and perform its responsibilities, and enforce its Bill of Rights. We call upon our fellow citizens to join with us in the prompt realization of these aims.

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pledges whatever. He wants to wait until each emergency arises and then decide just what action will be taken. It should be obvious after the past twenty-five years that such a pledge is no pledge at all. Emergencies will arise precisely because we have made no commitment and the aggressors feel confident that we shall be afraid to take the necessary action.

The degree and amount of American isolationism after the war depend in large measure on the character of the peace. Following 1918, the people of this country were confirmed, to say the least, in their feeling that they had done well to keep clear of European entanglements, by the news of the secret treaties of 1916 and by the subsequent actions of the League of Nations under the selfish and hypocritical pressure of the great powers, and especially France and England. A refusal to deal fairly and justly with the people of India, a determination to restore King George in Greece or King Peter in Yugoslavia against the wishes of the people of those countries, would enormously strengthen the hands of the isolationists at home. It will be seen that we are caught in a vicious circle. If experience is any guide, failure of America to participate in world affairs will mean that those affairs would be conducted on a lower level than would otherwise be the case; yet this development would be used by American isolationists as a continuous reason for abstention.

The Veterans and the Peace

A FACTOR of enormous importance in relation to America's postwar role will be the influence of our returned soldiers. They will be almost three times as numerous as in the last war; and already there are evidences that they are far more politically conscious than were the doughboys of 1917. What will they want to say about America in the postwar years?

So far as the records indicate, during the quarter of a century between wars the influence of the returned soldiers was almost wholly negative and harmful. No doubt there were many thousands of men who took off their uniforms and became good citizens in every sense of the word; but this very fact prevents us from being able to say anything about them. The only formal voice the returned soldiers have had was that of the veterans' organizations, of which the American Legion has been the most important. Unfortunately, the Legion for the most part has fallen under the control of ultra-conservatives. It began by participating in the Red hunts of the early twenties; and despite the fact that there was never the slightest danger of a Communist revolution in this country, legionnaires did many brutal and violent acts, of which let us hope they are now heartily ashamed. In nearly all parts of the country, the veterans' organizations were not only anti-radical but anti-trade union. Their only other public activity that is widely known was the policy of extorting from the national treasury, through political blackmail, payments to former soldiers which seemed to the average citizen excessive in the extreme.

Has the Legion undergone a reformation? Some of the resolutions adopted at its recent meetings have been a good deal more sensible than earlier ones. The veterans are all twenty-five years older, and one can learn a lot in twenty-five years. But the new potential members of veterans' organizations when this war ends will be about the same age that the present members were in 1918. They will swamp the older men by the sheer bulk of numbers. The leaders of the present legionnaires, and the dominant groups in other veterans' organizations, will do all they can to bring in the new men as members and to indoctrinate them with their own reactionary philosophy. What chance have they of succeeding?

We have little available evidence as to the political ideas of the present members of the armed forces. We are told that they frequently express great indignation about strikes in war plants; but this is probably no more than a simple and natural reaction of men in danger of their lives who feel they are being let down by those whose job it is to keep them supplied. We are also told that there are more Democrats than Republicans in the army, in comparison with the figures for the whole population. This is partly because voluntary enlistments were especially heavy in the South, and partly because the New Deal at its best has appealed strongly to youth.

There is a good deal of testimony that the members of the American armed forces have no strong ideological views about this war. They are fighting "for apple pie"—to get it over and go back home. They hate the Japanese bitterly, the Germans a good deal less so. They hated the Italians, while Italy was still in the war, hardly at all. They feel strongly that something ought to be done to prevent a third world war; but their fathers felt just as keenly twenty-five years ago, and believed much more strongly that war had at last been abolished.

For reasons that they have never bothered to make clear, the American army authorities have omitted any attempt to indoctrinate our soldiers with anti-fascist ideas. Their current-events classes are described as usually perfunctory and inadequate, consisting chiefly of a rehash of the contents of some recent issue of a news magazine. Frequently the lieutenant or captain detailed to conduct such a class is himself an ultra-reactionary who is likely to express hair-raising animosity toward the Russians, or for that matter, Great Britain. A number of private soldiers have written at various times to The New Republic to say that showing too much interest in the news, or the slightest touch of liberalism, is likely to brand you as "a dangerous Red,"

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and this may have an extremely serious effect on your army career. Despite all protests to the contrary, there is solid evidence that the army has discriminated against Americans who fought in Spain against the Germans and Italians, on the side of the Loyalists, whose crime, as someone has remarked, consisted in being anti-fascist several years too soon.

There is certainly great danger that the returned soldiers will become on the whole a reactionary element in American life, and obviously, everything possible should be done to prevent this, both now and in the postwar world. It is good news that the CIO is fostering a veterans' organization of its own to offset the anti-unionism of the American Legion. All possible pressure should be brought to bear on the War Department to teach our soldiers what this war is about, and at least to indicate to them that the Russians are our allies and the fascists are our enemies. It is a ridiculous and intolerable paradox that in this war for democracy, few American private soldiers should dare to indicate publicly that they are friends of democracy.

America and European Revolution

BY FAR TOO LITTLE ATTENTION has been paid in this country to the unfulfilled revolutions that are still going on in the Western European countries. These revolutions were frozen by the Nazi occupations; but they have not been destroyed, and the moment the German yoke is removed, the forward march will begin again. The Germans have killed many of the leaders; but new ones arise to take their places. By destroying many of the institutions of conservative capitalism in Western Europe the Nazis have, without meaning to, aided the march of the revolutionary forces.

These revolutionary elements are not, in most countries, mainly Communists owing allegiance to Soviet Russia, although the Communists are strong in several of these countries. The main elements are liberal and democratic, and they move toward state socialism by evolutionary means, with strong attention to civil rights and the freedom of the individual.

What will be the attitude of the British and American governments toward such revolutionary impulses? In recent months many people have been greatly disturbed by our apparent failure to distinguish between liberal and reactionary forces in several countries. At times it has seemed as though we would welcome the aid of almost any fascist if he would be diplomatic enough to call himself an anti-fascist. These compromises have been excused on the ground of military expediency; and there is no doubt that in certain cases this excuse has been valid. But the plain fact is that in the American State Department and in the British Foreign Office there are important officials who prefer the reactionaries just because they are reactionaries; who deplore the liberal and democratic tendency when it extends from the political into the economic area; and who have both the power and the will to obstruct that tendency in every possible way, and throughout Europe.

In the long run, however, it is impossible to believe that the reactionaries will succeed. Russia will be a powerful counteracting force. Fascism will be at a heavy discount for a long time to come. The conservatives in occupied Europe have in many cases sided openly with the Nazis, and their neighbors know this. Whatever we may do, or not do, a good many Quislings and near-Quislings will be efficiently assassinated by their neighbors. All existing institutions will be in a state of flux. The longing for continued peace will be overwhelming, and the liberal and democratic forces have a much better story to tell to the people, on this score, than have the conservative-nationalist-imperialist elements.

A series of left-wing governments in European countries would certainly make a profound impression on America, and most of all on the American working class, particularly if it coincided with a reactionary Republican regime in this country. A great many Americans lost their easy, cocksure belief that we are infallible, invincible and completely superior, when the great depression of the thirties proved that we were not able to prevent sixteen million or more competent workers from being out of jobs, and thirty-five or forty millions from living at a level far below what we proudly call the American standard. The lesson that political conservatism goes with nationalism and that the two militate heavily against a peaceful world will not be lost in this country any more than elsewhere. If the new governments of Western Europe can provide a substantial degree of security for their populations—which should certainly prove no insuperable task—the impact on American thinking will be serious.

So far as the general public is concerned, antagonism to Soviet Russia during the past quarter of a century has been based partly on the absence of civil liberties, partly on the fact that the standard of living remained low. It is interesting to speculate on what may be the result on American opinion of Russian conditions after the war. We now see that for at least ten years past the shortage of consumers' goods in Russia has been largely because she was desperately preparing for the present war, not in an aggressive spirit but in a defensive one. Her most dangerous potential enemies during that time were Germany and Japan, both of whom will presumably be eliminated for decades to

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come. There is small likelihood, especially in view of the Moscow Conference, that America and Britain would attempt an attack on Russia after this war, and still smaller likelihood that it would succeed if they did. It is quite possible therefore that with the coming of peace we shall see a rapid improvement in the Russian standard of living that will startle and deeply impress the world.

Meanwhile, America cannot fail to take note of the significant changes in the British social organization before and during this war. These changes are sometimes exaggerated in British propaganda, but they are real and important. "Tory socialism" has taken England some distance along the road which the New Deal represented in the United States. All classes in England have learned to accept what the American upper classes are still fighting bitterly—heavy taxation of the rich, balanced by extensive social services for the poor, in order to keep the national economy on an even keel.

Political scientists often remark that the American Constitution is by far the oldest governing doctrine in the world. Every other country of importance has undergone profound and often revolutionary changes since our system was set up. In many other ways, too, we are today the most conservative country in the world. Nowhere else is private capitalism so firmly entrenched, or doing so well, as here. While people like Frank Gannett scream their heads off that Mr. Roosevelt is a Communist dictator, in fact, big business, after ten years of his presidency, is making enormous profits and is confronted by not a single serious obstacle. Probably we shall continue for many years longer to lag behind the worldwide procession; but it is inevitable that we shall finally move in the same direction. And we can save ourselves much needless suffering if we will accept the realities of the situation and consciously work with the tides of history to make our country, in an old but by no means discredited phrase, a land fit for heroes to live in.

The Machinery of Peace Policy

WHETHER America wins or loses the peace will depend on three broad sets of factors. First, the *policies* adopted by the policy-makers of the nation in the area of foreign affairs. Second, the *public opinion* that prevails among the people on the questions of the peace. Third, the *machinery and techniques* that are used in shaping our peace policy. The first two we have already discussed. It is to the third that we now turn.

Our peace policy, whatever may be the opinions as to what it ought to be, will in the end have to be formulated and expressed by the President, the State Department and Congress. This raises the questions of how well these governmental bodies work together, how well suited they are to convey the beliefs and will of the people, how well they function as democratic instruments and are subject to democratic controls. There is a measure of truth in Alexander Pope's famous dictum:

> O'er forms of government let fools contest
> Whate'er is best administered, is best.

Yet it should not obscure the equally valid truth that if the forms of government are archaic they cannot be well administered, nor can they express the impulses and claims of even the best public opinion.

New Techniques of Diplomacy

THE STATE DEPARTMENT is technically only an instrument of the executive power, but it deserves separate consideration because it makes the day-to-day decisions that will go far toward shaping the peace. Americans do not sufficiently understand the extent to which the details that are decided from day add up to the eventual "big" policies. This is the area in which the State Department operates, and hardly anyone else. It is as if the policy-makers in the Department, by what they are now doing in American diplomacy from Spain to China and from Russia to the Argentine, were pricking out laboriously the lines that will eventually form the map of the world.

This idea must not, of course, be pushed too hard or far: the State Department must work within limits. It must reckon with the President and with American opinion. It cannot, as the fiasco of its North African policy has shown, shape a new regime against the overwhelming wish of the people involved. It must, however unwillingly, face the enormous fact of Russian prestige and power, and find a *modus vivendi* with that prestige and power. But within these limits one must recognize that through the diplomacy of the State Department we have already, even in wartime, set in motion some of the machinery of peacemaking. For, to twist a much-abused quotation from Clausewitz, peace is merely the continuation of diplomacy by other means. The *faits accomplis* of the temporary governments which we have helped set up in Europe and the Far East, by the time the formal peacemaking starts, will count for much in the final dispositions made.

Therein lies the great power of the State Department. Almost alone among governmental agencies it is the supreme master of the *fait accompli*. Woodrow Wilson once set up as an ideal for a democratic machin-

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ery of foreign policy "open covenants openly arrived at." But this is obviously unobtainable. The best that can be achieved is open covenants secretly arrived at. As Harold Laski has put it: while the proposal of marriage must be made in private, the engagement can be celebrated in public. And it is because of this inherent secrecy of diplomacy that in every nation the Foreign Office has an almost monopoly position in setting the stage for the final peace decisions.

If American public opinion is still somewhat skeptical as to whether we shall join in fashioning a democratic and secure peace, one reason for the skepticism is therefore the traditional mechanism and policies of the State Department. At no time in our history have these been so dramatically brought to our attention as in the crises preceding and during World War II. Joseph M. Jones, a former member of the Department, has pointed out in a striking article in a recent issue of Fortune, how antiquated is the administrative machinery of the Department, and how much in need of reorganization is the whole far-flung structure of consular and diplomatic officials. Add to this that the selection of personnel has for generations been from a narrowly restricted group, that there is no provision for regular reports to the President and the people, that there is no way provided for taking account of the popular will and coming back to the wellspring of the democratic impulse. All these elements come dangerously close to forming a climate of departmental opinion independent in temper from that of the rest of the administration—something that may be, and in fact has been, called the State Department mind.

Latterly, however, there have been signs of some dents in this tradition. One factor has been the entrance of the army into the calculations of political policy in the liberated areas. The final effect of this is not yet clear. Up to now, with respect to policy toward Spain, Italy and the French, it has tended—if anything—to reinforce the traditional State Department prejudices in favor of coöperating with conservative and anti-democratic elements. Since the existing armed forces that have either to be immobilized or brought over on our side are under the command of those elements, there has generally been a military explanation for the extent to which we sought to collaborate with those who once collaborated with the enemy. So commingled have the military and diplomatic viewpoints become, that it has not always been clear—in, let us say, the North African and Italian situations—whether General Eisenhower was taking his cue from Robert Murphy as State Department representative, or Robert

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Murphy taking his cue from General Eisenhower as military commander.

This mingling of the military and diplomatic is likely to continue not only until the German surrender, but beyond it, during the transition period. For there will be problems of the ousting of Nazi garrisons at minimum cost of life, as there are today in Italy. And there will be problems of the creation and maintenance of order. It will quite possibly be argued that this will require the transitional continuance of the regimes of the past. But a more cogent argument is likely to be that the best way to create and maintain order—and to release Allied armies from the tasks of occupation—is to place trust in the responsible democratic elements which will express the sentiment of the popular majorities. Thus the military factor may in the end weight our policy in a democratic direction.

That has clearly been the consequence of our having to reckon with the popular temper of some of our allies. To our Embassy in London, President Roosevelt sent John G. Winant; and to the Embassy in Moscow, he has now sent W. Averell Harriman. Both represent a break from the main diplomatic tradition. Winant was a brilliant choice to fit the popular mood of an England which—whatever the position of its ruling political and economic group—is in a ferment of new ideas and attitudes on account of the war. And Harriman, at once sympathetic and hard-headed, is the sort of man with whom the Russians like to do business. If such men can become dominant in our diplomacy as a whole, a healthy base will have been laid for the peace talks themselves.

But however promising this new departure from the diplomatic tradition, there are other developments which may carry greater weight. The prime fact about the postwar world and its making, from the standpoint of machinery, is likely to be the role of the administrative technician. One of the most fruitful ventures in United Nations coöperation has been the Food Conference. A Relief and Rehabilitation Conference is in session as this goes to press. These are undoubtedly forerunners of a whole series of similar technical groups, whose function it will be not only to prepare the ground technically for the political decisions, but to act as a leverage in those decisions as well, and to sustain the operation of whatever international administrative machinery the peace settlements will agree upon.

This is likely to be the crux of the new diplomacy. For food and relief and machine tools and capital investment and tariff agreements and labor pools and military commissions are likely to be the blood and bone out of which, if at all, a new postwar world will be fashioned. They can be dangerous weapons if they are used, by powerful aggregates like America and the British Empire, to defeat the democratic will. They can be healthy instruments if they are used to give the world a new economic base from which to start its dynamic expansion.

Technical commissions are, of course, not a novelty in international affairs. But in the past they have generally been used either to arbitrate disputes or to settle boundary quarrels. President Wilson took with him to the Peace Conference a large body of experts, but their competence was likely to be in political and economic geography, in boundaries and in national minorities. The League of Nations and the International Labor Office, whatever else may be said of them, gave a fillip and a habituation to the standing commission on trans-national issues. And since America and Russia are likely to be the two great powers on whose coöperation the future of world peace will depend, it is worth noting that the technical commission is native to the national genius of each. Both Socialist Russia and New Deal America have made administration the fulcrum of government. And both of them, as well as Britain and the other nations, will have to adapt their national administrative machinery to admit the techniques of international consultation, decision and action.

It is not yet clear, so far as America is concerned, whether this new machinery will come organizationally within the province of the State Department. Relief and rehabilitation are within it. Food is outside of it, as are also the activities of the new Office of International Economic Administration. But whether within or outside the Department, here are the growing-points of diplomacy. The bounds of traditional diplomacy will have to burst to admit them. It is still possible that this expansion of scope and function may accomplish that renovation in diplomatic machinery and policy which decades of mordant criticism of the State Department have been unable to achieve.

This does not imply on our part an uncritical acceptance of experts and technical machinery, as if they determined their own social ends. They do not. But there is one immense advantage in having the President the sole organ of our external relations. It gives to these technical bodies, including the State Department itself, a single political head. It thus centers both direction and responsibility. And it makes possible what would otherwise seem such unexplained changes of phase in our foreign policy as that which is embodied in the Moscow Pact. While day-to-day policy is made by the diplomats and technicians, the President is able to step in at crucial moments, and give the policy the direction which the sheer logic of world events and the strong pressures of public opinion require.

That is what happened at the Moscow Conference, and—given a continuing logic and public opinion of the same sort—that is what may continue to happen on a larger scale and in a maturer phase of the organization of a postwar world.

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The President and Congress

THERE IS no one point at which the treaty-making power is located by the American Constitution. It is true, as Marshall and Jefferson have pointed out, that the President is the "sole organ of our foreign relations," and that "the transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether." Yet it is also true that no legislative body in the world has today as much power in the area of foreign policy as the United States Senate. Put these two truths together and you get the great paradox of American peace-making. Constitutionally, the paradox is resolved by the fact that the power to make treaties and ratify them is given to the President, but he must exercise it "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," "provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." In practice this leaves the power allocated, but not located. Thomas Hobbes has said that "when two ride on one horse, one must ride in front." Thus the procedure for ratifying treaties is a continuous invitation to both the President and Congress for a struggle for power.

The invitation to struggle has in the past been accepted by both sides. And it has been sharpened by several factors in our recent history. First, there has been a trend toward the expansion of the presidential power in general. Strong American Presidents have always sought to exercise a strong hand over foreign affairs, acting in effect as their own Secretaries of State, and deferring to Congress only as they had to do so constitutionally. Second, as the Senate has lost much of its working power over domestic affairs, which, largely because of their technical character, have been absorbed into the administrative agencies, it has become more sensitive about its dignity and function in foreign affairs. Third, international decisions on a major scale are today made principally among highly centralized world powers, and on a more or less personal basis among their leaders. However one may regard this in terms of theory or desirability, the fact is that when the ordinary American today thinks of the Peace Conference, he thinks of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and perhaps Chiang Kai-shek, seated around a table.

Add to this a fourth fact—namely, that the struggle between a President and a Congress, at the end of a war, over the nature of the peace has always become tangled up with the struggle between the two parties for victory in the coming presidential election—and you have the stage set for the dramatic enactment by which Americans always end wars in a burst of partisanship and governmental conflict.

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The bitterest friction between the President and Congress over the issues of reconstruction was that which led to the impeachment proceedings against President Johnson after the Civil War. But the issues there were national rather than international. The two Presidents who have in the past played the largest roles as international peace-makers were Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. It was TR who first thought in terms of America as a world power. It was Wilson whose clash with the Senate over the issue of the League of Nations was so fateful and tragic as to furnish the classic example of the titanic battle of wills within the American governmental machinery for peace.

What happened to Woodrow Wilson at the Peace Conference, with Congress, and with American public opinion, forms without doubt the most important single body of relevant experience to guide President Roosevelt or whoever else may be President when hostilities are over. The story of how, after winning World War I, we bungled World Peace I, is likely to be told and retold in the next few years, and become once more the center of a great historical controversy with political implications. Each person is likely to pick the angle that best refracts the light he wants to elicit.

There can be little doubt that President Roosevelt has been profoundly impressed by the whole episode of Wilson and World Peace I. As a young Wilsonian at the time, and a minor member of Wilson's official family, he lived through it; as vice-presidential candidate in the 1920 election, which was the sequel to Wilson's defeat in the peace, he was part of the whole experience. It is likely to have left him convictions about Wilson's ideas and his political tactics which have been further mulled over in the course of the past quarter-century. Part of the clue to what he has already done in foreign policy, and what he is likely to do if the making of the peace is entrusted to him by the American people, must be sought in the lessons of Wilson's experience.

About many of his ideas Wilson was profoundly right; about many of his tactics he was just as profoundly wrong. He was not wrong to set a precedent by leaving the country and heading up his own peace delegation—for all the outcry the Republican press made about it. No one else would have had a chance of coping with the cunning of Lloyd George and the tenacity of Clemenceau, and of building the League of Nations into the peace structure. Whether there will again be a formal Peace Conference is doubtful: we have learned that it is a vulnerable procedure, because it becomes the focus of a whole parallelogram of pressures and frictions. It is more likely that the main business of creating order out of a war-torn world will be left to a succession of technical conferences such as we have referred to above. But the big political decisions will have to be made by a conference among the heads of states.

But if Wilson was not wrong to go to the Conference, he was wrong in the political strategy connected with it. He made a fatal mistake in 1918 in appealing to the country to elect a Democratic Congress, which would enable him to make a lasting peace. It was part of his insight to see that Congress would be the stumbling-block; and it was natural for him to translate the logic of his passionate insight into an open appeal. But this went against the grain of Americans, who pride themselves on their right to have one part of the government check another, and their freedom to bungle things if they wish. President Roosevelt has thus far not made this sort of mistake, nor is he likely to in the future.

Even more serious was Wilson's mistake in taking no Senators with him on his delegation to the Conference. Had he taken an outstanding Senator from each of the two major parties—a moderate, not one of the die-hards from either extreme of the spectrum of feeling about the League—the whole history of the world might have been changed. For there were only a handful of die-hards on either side of the League question when Wilson brought the Treaty back. The large majority of the Senate were moderates who were won over finally to the opposition. This mistake of Wilson's is also not likely to be repeated by the President who negotiates the next treaty. There is a very strong probability that a Secretary of State who has the complete confidence of the Senate, and several of the Senators themselves, will be an integral part of the formulation of the treaty.

If this happens, the treaty itself is likely to be a much better one than the one fashioned at Versailles. For Wilson worked in the shadow of what one commentator has called "the spectre on Capitol Hill." For the executive to fashion a treaty himself, while always seeking to anticipate congressional opposition, means to fashion a weaker treaty than one confidently made with congressional participation. Wilson worked in the context of a double fear. One was fear of Henry Cabot Lodge and the power he wielded in Congress. The other was fear of the Russian Revolution and its possible consequences in Europe. As a result he brought back a treaty which disillusioned the hopes of many American liberals, so that they gave him little support while he was meeting the opposition of the reactionaries.

The moral for the coming peace is clear with respect to both fears. If the great political decisions, made in concert with the other powers, come from a desire to appease a reactionary Congress, they will be crippled at the start. If they are made out of a fear of the democratic revolutions in Europe, they will lack liberal support. And the Moscow Pact is an indication that an attitude of courageous coöperation with Russia can, with the proper strategy, be made acceptable to Congress as well.

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The Two-Thirds Rule

BUT ACCEPTABLE to how much of Congress? The chief presidential power lies in negotiating a treaty. When the President has proposed, it is the Senate that disposes. And since the Senate can give its consent only by a vote of two-thirds of those present, the treaty has to run a formidable gantlet. In effect, this means that one-third plus one man of those present hold the power of veto over the coming peace. Some commentators have also pointed out that if only a bare quorum is present, this puts the veto power in the hands of a little more than one-sixth of the Senate; and if the negative votes are weighted in the direction of the less populous states, it means that Senators representing a few million Americans have the power to frustrate the will of the overwhelming mass of the American people. This is obviously the machinery of minority rule, as it is also the mathematics of anarchy. And while it is unlikely that the vote would divide in the extreme fashion premised above, every campaign must prepare for the worst while it works for the best. The extreme operation of minority rule is a possibility. And it is a possibility because the American machinery of treaty-ratification is archaic.

Wilson's treaty was beaten in the Senate, and with it the membership of America in a League of Nations, and with that the hope for any genuine collective security among the great powers. The fact that the Treaty was not so good, or the League so strong, as the liberals wished is beside the point. The real point is that even what Wilson brought back was too strong for the congressional palate. A start had to be made somewhere, and Congress would not tolerate even the relatively weak start for which Wilson asked.

In historical perspective this is now clear enough. Yet it was not clear at the time either to the Senators or to the American people. And it is the beginning of wisdom about the coming peace to understand that this may happen again, without any contemporary clarity on our part about what is happening.

For the campaign to wreck the Treaty and the League was a well planned campaign, and skillfully executed. Its guiding genius was that of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge. The materials he had at hand to work with were these: a coming presidential election and a Republican Party panting to return to power after two terms of deprivation; a press anxious to help in this return; a Senate raked with the fires of old hatreds and new ambitions and jealous of its prerogatives in the area of foreign policy; a public opinion which, while vaguely in favor of internationalism, had little organization in that direction; the tradition of isolationist nationalism; and a President who, while retaining all his vision and passion, had lost his skill in political tactics. A new peace generation today can make its own analysis and see which of these factors are no longer

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applicable, and which of them still obtain. It would seem to us that the principal differences lie in the political skill of President Roosevelt and in the existence of an organized will to peace among ordinary people and not just the educated groups.

The Lodge tactic within the Senate was to avoid an immediate vote on the Treaty as a whole. Lodge wanted Wilson to appear to be the uncompromising partisan. He himself posed as wanting a compromise treaty with "reservations." Thus, he was able to win over the larger number of the middle-of-the-road Senators. In the ratifying of treaties an amendment changes the substance of the treaty; a reservation leaves the treaty as it is, but whittles down the commitments and obligations we assume under it. The Lodge reservations were such as to take much of the heart out of the Treaty, and Wilson thought them worse than no treaty at all. Yet even the Treaty with reservations could not muster a two-thirds vote. It got a good majority, but fell short of two-thirds by seven votes. And the same thing happened only a few years ago to the proposal that America join the World Court.

It should be clear from this analysis that, whatever other factors complicated the peace failure of Woodrow Wilson, the two-thirds rule is bound to prove a serious obstacle in the future. It is an archaic survival from the eighteenth century, when the principle of governmental checks had more prestige than it has today, and when the Senate was a small enough body so that the Founding Fathers hoped it could become a sort of Foreign Affairs Cabinet. The most sensible and most often suggested method for changing it is a constitutional amendment providing that treaties be ratified by the President with the consent of a majority of both Houses of Congress. This would leave Congress as an integral part of foreign policy; it would avoid concentrating too much power in the executive; it would not incur the dangers of the English system, where Baldwin and Chamberlain had their own way in an atrocious foreign policy because Parliament did not dare vote them down lest it mean a general election; and it would mean that the peace could be ratified by majority will. This was also the method originally suggested with impressive clairvoyance in the Constitutional Convention by James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who foresaw that the two-thirds rule would mean minority rule and the sabotaging of any agreement.

The trouble with an amendment is, of course, the rigid and difficult amendment process. Professor Corwin has said that there is not "the least likelihood in the world" of such an amendment. "When two-thirds of the Senate consent to relax any of that body's powers something like the millennium will have dawned," he writes. That is true. But an amendment can be passed without the Senate. It can be proposed by a convention called by two-thirds of the state legislatures, and it can be adopted by the vote of three-fourths of state legislatures or conventions. This is difficult, as the history of the amending process has shown. But it is possible if the American people have the will for a lasting peace.

Those who think an amendment impossible, but recognize the danger of the two-thirds rule, suggest that new and constitutional modes of ratification have already been developed. One is the executive agreement. Ever since the Rush-Bagot Treaty in 1817, for limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes, the executive agreement—without Senate consent—has been recognized as binding and valid. A famous instance of it was John Hay's negotiation of the agreement on the Open Door policy in China, which Henry Adams hailed as a meteoric achievement in diplomacy. The Moscow Pact is itself the latest of such uses of the executive agreement. Congress has also in several instances delegated to the President its treaty-making power by authorizing him to enter into trade agreements with other nations. And the whole network of our relations with the other members of the United Nations has largely been determined by executive agreements. No doubt many of the single stones in the arch of the coming peace will be laid thus. But the keystone itself—the basic agreement for a structure of world order and for the pooling of international power to put down aggression—is unlikely to be slipped by the Senate in such a fashion.

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Another suggested method is the Joint Resolution of both Houses. It was used, after treaties had failed to pass the Senate, in the annexation of both Texas and Hawaii. It was also used more recently to make America a part of the International Labor Office. But while Representative Fulbright has argued that it could be used to ratify the coming peace—and theoretically his position is sound—it is difficult to see its being done without a great uproar. Nevertheless, there is much to the contention that if a majority of Congress want to have either the executive agreement or the Joint Resolution used, they can accomplish it.

Main Drift and Great Task

THERE ARE, then, no insurmountable problems, whether of policy, public opinion or governmental machinery, which stand between America and a workable postwar world. Fortunately we can say that all the imperatives of our time work toward such a world. The main drift is in that direction. The great task is to organize it and make it orderly.

For men all over the world are coming to understand that only by the forging of a *democratic world will* can an enduring peace be achieved. This understanding has not come about through the spread of sweetness and light. It has come the hard way, through agony and anarchy. The world has passed through the torture of fascism and the devastation of war. Men have come to see that wars are not over merely because the shooting has ceased. They have come to see how unstable is the balance of the so-called balance of power, how fragile the fabric of civilization when it is at the mercy of aggression which the other nations allow to go unpunished by collective action, how thin the veneer that separates man the citizen from man the beast. They have come to see that wars are not over until a structure of internal civic order has been created within each nation through a minimum of economic security, and a minimum guarantee of human rights; and until a structure of international civic order has been created by the machinery of international consent, and the fusion of the international will to meet aggression with force.

This understanding is coming in America as well. It is not so sharp and fresh here as it is in Europe and China. The reason is perhaps that our cities have not been bombed, our homes burned, our children murdered. We have not seen the dread visage of fascism face to face, as others have. And so there are still many American groups who retain the luxury of a detachment in which they balance "national sovereignty" against national suicide.

But the weight of world forces is against this sort of dialectical pettifoggery. The great drift in Europe is toward a European federal unity of some sort that can encompass the divergences of Catholic and Protestant states, agrarian and industrial states, Latin, Teutonic and Slavic states, capitalist and socialist states. The arguments as to whether this is desirable and possible have been reduced to academic exercises. The European peoples are coming to see that unless it happens, the only alternative is another and greater catastrophe of fascism and war. There is a majesty in the sheer rigor of events that has overridden national, racial and social differences in the past, and can do so again in the future. When England and Russia and America, from 1940 on, faced the common danger of fascist victory, they did not argue about sovereignty. When they now face the common problems of settling their differences over the reorganization of European life, they have shown a willingness to join in hammering out a pattern on which they can all agree. The alternative is chaos. And one could make out a case for the argument that the great forward movements in the struggle of organization against anarchy have taken place in history exactly at those times when the alternative was chaos.

America, more than any other of the great powers, presents a peculiar problem because she has a centrifugal structure of government in a centripetal world. We have already discussed the two-thirds rule for treaties, and the fact that the relationship between the President and Congress in foreign affairs is an invitation to struggle. Our election machinery is such that no sooner

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is a leader chosen than he becomes necessarily the focus of denigration, abuse and obstruction. We have a multiverse of religious and ethnic-national groups within the universe of our nation. It is difficult for our allies, in negotiation with our leaders, to count on their being backed up by Congress or by public opinion. Yet it is equally true that, in the crisis of the Great Depression, America more signally than any other nation forged a New Deal which fused democratic energy with freedom; that in world affairs President Roosevelt has, for all our criticisms of aspects of his foreign policy, achieved a leadership in world opinion without losing any of his cunning of hand or skill as an equilibrator of political forces. These facts speak well for the future of America in a peace settlement under his leadership, if his leadership can be retained.

The task of both leadership and people in the next decade of American life will be as massive as in the past decade. There will be difficult political decisions to be made within a United Nations framework. There will be delicate negotiations over problems of divergent national economic interests. There will be the need for coping with the worldwide influence of international cartels and national monopolies. There will be the difficulty of educating an international popular opinion despite a general reactionary press. There will be the danger of putting so much weight on international stability that we shall tend to freeze the existing distribution of power between classes.

The task is great. But so also are the resources that we have at hand for it. And so also is the American tradition of achievement.

Above all else, America has been in its past history the world's greatest laboratory in the federal process. We are not speaking here only of the original frame of government that formed thirteen states into a federal unity. We are speaking even more of the fusion of divergent ethnic, national and economic groups into a working scheme. Until recently we have worked in the relatively insulated chamber of our nation. Now we have a world scope for our task. It is as silly to say that this will mean a whittling away of our sovereignty as it is to say that it will mean a violation of our Constitution. Just as the individual reaches a fuller sovereignty in the context of a family, so the nation does in an orderly world. Its freedom of choice is initially restricted, only to lead to a fuller freedom because of the conditions of world order. And it would mean not a violation but a fulfilment of the basic premise of the American Constitution if the rule of law were extended the world over.

BRUCE BLIVEN, MAX LERNER, GEORGE SOULE

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